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Why California's Second-Degree Felony-
Murder Rule Is Now Void for Vagueness
by EVAN TSEN LEE*
Introduction
For years, justices on the California Supreme Court ("CSC")
have engaged in public soul-searching about whether to overrule the
state's second-degree felony-murder doctrine.' Now there is a
powerful external reason for the CSC to revisit the question: The
United States Supreme Court ("USSC") has just struck down the so-
called "residual clause" of the federal three-strikes statute as
unconstitutionally vague. Although the immediate intuition of
experienced judges and lawyers will be to deny that this decision has
any application to the felony-murder rule, this Article will show that,
from the standpoint of vagueness, the two provisions are materially
indistinguishable.
On June 26, 2015, the USSC handed down Johnson v. United
States, in which the Court found that the so-called "residual clause" of
the "violent felony" provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act
("ACCA") 2 is void for vagueness.3  The ACCA mandates long
sentences for felons-in-possession-of-a-firearm if they have previously
been convicted of three "violent felonies."4  The residual clause
contained an alternative definition of violent felony that included any
felony involving conduct that presented a "serious potential risk of
* Professor of Law, UC Hastings. Thanks to Kate Bloch, Erwin Chemerinsky,
Scott Dodson, Laurie Levenson, and Lois Weithorn for their wise counsel on an earlier
draft.
1. See People v. Sarun Chun, 45 Cal. 4th 1172, 1182-83 (2009) (upholding the rule's
constitutionality, but also chronicling individual justices' past expressions of doubts about
the rule's constitutionality).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006).
3. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551,2557 (2015).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2).
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physical injury."5  The Johnson Court held that the constitutional
problem with the residual clause was that the analysis of risk was not
based on actual facts, but on hypothetical facts.6 In other words,
under the residual clause, a court had to imagine the "ordinary"
commission of the felony in question and then ask whether that set of
hypothetical facts presented a serious risk of injury.7 The result was
that defendants were deprived of any meaningful advance notice of
which felonies would eventually be denominated "violent" and which
ones would not.
In striking down the residual clause, Justice Scalia's majority
opinion was careful and narrow. After all, there are many state and
federal criminal laws that hinge criminality or sentence enhancements
on the presence of "unreasonable risk" or "substantial risk" or
something similar. 8 Think about involuntary manslaughter, which in
most states amounts to criminally negligent homicide.9  The
defendant killed the victim by way of conduct that presented a
substantial risk of death of which a reasonable person in the actor's
situation should have been aware. If Johnson had held that any
statute criminalizing conduct based on "risk" was vague, it would
have augured a massive rewrite of criminal codes.
Instead, Justice Scalia's Johnson opinion performed a precise
surgical excision. Under well-established ACCA case law, the
supposed "violent felony" in question must be analyzed
"categorically" and not based on the defendant's real conduct. ° Put
differently, analysis under the residual clause is a totally abstract
analytical exercise. It is abstract in two senses: the determination of
how much risk is "serious" presents an abstract question, and the
determination of what facts the "ordinary" commission of a given
felony involves also presents an abstract question. This is in contrast
to, say, involuntary manslaughter analysis, which presents an abstract
question tied to a concrete one: the question of what constitutes a
"substantial risk" or "unreasonable risk" of death is abstract, but the
precise facts of the case are concrete.
5. Id. at § 924(e)(2)(B).
6. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557-60.
7. Id. at 2557-58.
8. Id. at 2561.
9. See Wayne R. LaFave, CRIMINAL LAW § 15.4 at 838-39 (5th ed. 2010).
10. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990).
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Even narrow rationales have some logical compass, however, and
Johnson's rationale completely envelops California's very peculiar
second-degree felony-murder rule. Under longstanding CSC
precedent, a felony must be "dangerous to human life" in order to
qualify as a predicate for second-degree felony-murder in California."
That itself does not distinguish the rule from those in other states,
which also require that felonies be dangerous before they may trigger
felony-murder. What makes the California rule unique is that it
requires the felony to be "inherently" dangerous, meaning that it
must be dangerous to human life no matter how it is committed. In
every other state, the felony must be "foreseeably" dangerous based
on the actual factual circumstances of the case. In California, the
dangerousness of the predicate felony is measured abstractly; in every
other state, it is measured concretely, based on the facts of the case.
Over the decades, the CSC has varied the abstractness of its
dangerousness inquiry, sometimes employing what I will call a
"minimum conduct"'12 (that is, least risky conduct) standard, other
times employing an "ordinary commission" standard. For vagueness
purposes under the rule of Johnson, however, it doesn't matter.
Abstract is abstract. And abstract, when it forms the field of
reference for a determination of risk in criminal law, is
unconstitutional.
This Article will briefly review the history of USSC vagueness
precedents, culminating in Johnson. It will then briefly review the
history of the inherently dangerous felony limitation on the second-
degree felony-murder rule in California. 3 By then, it will be
abundantly clear why California's current second-degree felony-
murder rule is unconstitutionally vague. There is a very simple fix
available to the CSC, which is to adopt the "actual facts" standard of
foreseeable dangerousness employed by every other state that has an
11. See infra notes 95-185 and accompanying text.
12. 1 use the term "minimum conduct" because that is the term used in immigration
law when the categorical approach is used to determine whether prior convictions qualify
for either federal sentencing enhancement or removal. See, e.g., Martinez v. Mukasey, 551
F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[Tlhe singular circumstances of an individual petitioner's
crimes should not be considered, and only the minimum criminal conduct necessary to
sustain a conviction under a given statute is relevant." (quoting Gertsenshteyn v.
Mukasey, 544 F.3d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 2008))).
13. California's second-degree felony-murder rule has other limitations as well. See
People v. Chun, 45 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009), for an explication of California's "merger" rule.
See People v. Washington, 40 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1964), for an example of California's
"agency" doctrine.
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unenumerated felony-murder doctrine. However, the Article will
further argue that the foreseeable dangerousness rule essentially
creates a category of "criminally negligent murder" without openly
admitting it. It has the effect of encouraging juries to overcome their
doubts about whether the government has adequately proved
conscious disregard for human life by in essence telling them that
negligence is good enough in any event. The time is ripe for the CSC
to do the right thing-to overrule the second-degree felony-murder
rule and to fall back onto the murder statute that the California
Legislature has actually written.
I. The Law of Vagueness
Johnson is the latest word on vagueness and thereby becomes the
focal point for any subsequent vagueness analysis. It is nonetheless
worth a brief look at from whence vagueness as a constitutional
doctrine sprang.
14
A. Origins
The early cases focused on lack of notice. United States v.
Reese,for example, involved federal criminal charges against
Kentucky officials alleged to have discriminated against a black
voter."5 The Court struck down the criminal statute on the ground
that, literally construed, it authorized punishment for more than just
race discrimination. This overbreadth rendered the statute not
"appropriate legislation" to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. 6 In
so holding, the Court stated, "Laws which prohibit the doing of
things, and provide a punishment for their violation, should not have
a double meaning. 1 7  "If the legislature undertakes to define by
statute a new offense," continued the Court, "and provides for its
punishment, it should express its will in language that need not
deceive the common mind. Every man should be able to know with
14. Although there are many law review articles on vagueness, they tend to focus
exclusively on applications of vagueness analysis to particular statutes or on the
relationship of vagueness to other constitutional doctrines. The most helpful general
article on vagueness is Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279 (2003). The locus classicus, now
somewhat dated, in Anthony Amsterdam's student note, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
15. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
16. Id. at 221-22.
17. Id. at 220.
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certainty when he is committing a crime. 18 Reese thus confirms that
the law of vagueness as a restriction on the enforcement of criminal
statutes came into being as the result of the advent and spread of
malum prohibitum offenses. A crime malum in se gave notice of its
illegality by its obvious immorality; a crime malum prohibitum did
not.
Another example of a malum prohibitum offense is a criminal
antitrust statute. In International Harvester Co. of America v.
Kentucky, the defendant corporation was prosecuted and fined for
violating state price-fixing conspiracy laws.' 9 Justice Holmes' opinion
reversing the convictions is worth excerpting, not only because it is
Holmes, but also because it eerily presages Johnson:
[F]or it shows how impossible it is to think away the
principal facts of the case as it exists, and say what
would have been the price in an imaginary world....
The reason is not the general uncertainties of a jury
trial, but that the elements necessary to determine the
imaginary ideal are uncertain both in nature and
degree of effect to the acutest commercial mind.
We regard this decision as consistent with Nash v.
United States [229 U.S. 373 (1913)] in which it was held
that a criminal law is not unconstitutional merely
because it throws upon men the risk of rightly
estimating a matter of degree,-what is an undue
restraint of trade. That deals with the actual, not with
an imaginary condition other than the facts.... To
compel them to guess, on peril of indictment, what the
community would have given for them if the
continually changing conditions were other than they
are, to an uncertain extent; to divine prophetically
what the reaction of only partially determinate facts
would be upon the imaginations and desires of
purchasers, is to exact gifts that mankind does not
20possess.
18. Id.
19. Int'l Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 229 U.S. 373 (1914).
20. Id. at 223.
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International Harvester is not on all fours with Johnson, as it
concerns the difficulty of predicting the imaginings of purchasers, not
the imaginings of judges. Still, International Harvester creates an
intellectual template for Johnson in that it finds constitutional fault
with a criminal statute for forcing citizens to gauge the criminality of
their contemplated acts on a hypothetical, rather than factual,
predicate. As with Johnson, the ultimate problem was lack of
sufficient notice.
Eventually, the Court's vagueness analysis made the leap from
statutes gauging criminality based on hypothetical facts to statutes
that were simply too open-ended in their liability standards. In
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., the defendant company was
punished under a criminal rate-fixing statute that "made unlawful for
any person willfully.., to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or
charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries. ,,2l Chief
Justice White stated:
Observe that the section forbids no specific or definite
act. It confines the subject-matter of the investigation
which it authorizes to no element essentially inhering
in the transaction as to which it provides. It leaves
open, therefore, the widest conceivable inquiry, the
scope of which no one can foresee and the result of
which no one can foreshadow or adequately guard
against. In fact, we see no reason to doubt the
soundness of the observation of the court below in its
opinion to the effect that, to attempt to enforce the
section would be the exact equivalent of an effort to
carry out a statute which in terms merely penalized
and punished all acts detrimental to the public interest
when unjust and unreasonable in the estimation of the
court and jury.22
In Connally v. General Construction Co., the defendant company
had been punished for violating a state minimum-wage law decreeing,
"[N]ot less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality
21. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1920).
22. Id.
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where the work is performed shall be paid .... " 23 The Court found it
unconstitutionally vague:
We are of opinion that this provision presents a
double uncertainty, fatal to its validity as a criminal
statute. In the first place, the words "current rate of
wages" do not denote a specific or definite sum ....
The 'current rate of wages' is not simple, but
progressive-from so much (the minimum) to so much
(the maximum), including all between; and to direct
the payment of an amount which shall not be less than
one of several different amounts, without saying
which, is to leave the question of what is meant
incapable of any definite answer.
In the second place, additional obscurity is
imparted to the statute by the use of the qualifying
word 'locality.' Who can say, with any degree of
accuracy, what areas constitute the locality where a
given piece of work is being done? .... It is said that
this question is settled for us by the decision of the
state Supreme Court on rehearing in State v. Tibbetts.
But all the court did there was to define the word
"locality" as meaning "place," "near the place,"
"vicinity," or "neighborhood." Accepting this as
correct, as of course we do, the result is not to remove
the obscurity, but rather to offer a choice of
uncertainties. The word "neighborhood" is quite as
susceptible of variation as the word "locality." Both
terms are elastic and, dependent upon circumstances,
may be equally satisfied by areas measured by rods or
by miles. 4
Whether or not one agrees with Connally-and agreement is
made harder by the fact that the labor commissioner gave explicit
warning to the company that its wages were too low and would be
prosecuted if it did not raise them by at least forty cents per hour-it
solidly reaffirmed that criminal proscriptions would be rendered
23. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 388 (1926).
24. Id. at 393-95.
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unenforceable if they were uncertain in multiple aspects. That
dynamic of uncertainty-compounding-uncertainty deprived criminal
laws of sufficient notice to satisfy due process.
Perhaps Connally, which ignored the actual notice given by the
commissioner to the company, in some way presaged the vagueness
doctrine's eventual turn toward a focus on the dangers of arbitrary
enforcement. It is possible to view Connally as resting on the
unarticulated major premise that a vague statute offends due process
even if the defendant at bar had a chance to avoid prosecution, so
long as the statute effectively gave law enforcement carte blanche in
deciding whom to go after. The fact that the General Construction
Company had actual notice may not (in the Court's mind) have
overcome the fact that the commissioner was essentially free to go
after any wage-paying employer in the jurisdiction because the
measure of liability in the statute could be manipulated almost
infinitely.
Whether or not Connally foreshadows it, the vagueness
doctrine's move toward a focus on arbitrary enforcement certainly
manifested itself in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville.2 There, the
Court found a loitering ordinance void for vagueness "both in the
sense that it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute, and
because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.,
26
Arbitrary enforcement as a ground for vagueness was also apparent
in Grayned v. City of Rockford, which, in rejecting a vagueness
challenge to a municipal anti-noise ordinance, noted that the law
"contains no broad invitation to subjective or discriminatory
enforcement., 27 "As always, enforcement requires the exercise of
some degree of police judgment, but, as confined, that degree of
judgment here is permissible," wrote Justice Marshall for the Court.'
It became clear in Kolender v. Lawson that the notice and
arbitrary enforcement prongs of the vagueness doctrine constituted
independently sufficient reasons for finding a criminal law
unconstitutional. Striking down a California loitering statute that
required an individual to produce a "credible and reliable" form of
25. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1969).
26. Id. at 162.
27. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 113 (1972).
28. Id. at 114.
29. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
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identification upon law enforcement demand, Justice O'Connor
stated the general rule for vagueness as follows: "[T]he void-for-
vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 3  The
"credible and reliable" clause of the loitering ordinance failed the
second prong of that rule. "[T]he statute vests virtually complete
discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect
has satisfied the statute and must be permitted to go on his way in the
absence of probable cause to arrest," stated Justice O'Connor. She
continued: "An individual, whom police may think is suspicious but
do not have probable cause to believe has committed a crime, is
entitled to continue to walk the public streets 'only at the whim of any
police officer' who happens to stop that individual under" the
ordinance. 2
More recently, in City of Chicago v. Morales, the Court
invalidated Chicago's "Gang Congregation Ordinance" on an anti-
arbitrary enforcement rationale.33 That rather peculiar ordinance
required four elements to be met before a violation could be found:
First, the police officer must reasonably believe that at
least one of the two or more persons present in a
public place is a criminal street gang membe[r].
Second, the persons must be loitering, which the
ordinance defines as remain[ing] in any one place with
no apparent purpose. Third, the officer must then
order all of the persons to disperse and remove
themselves from the area. Fourth, a person must
disobey the officer's order.'
Because the ordinance had no requirement of a harmful purpose,
and because it applied to non-gang members as well as suspected
30. Id. at 357 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982)
(finding that an ordinance requiring a license for a retailer of marijuana paraphernalia was
not vague in the context of a pre-enforcement challenge where there was not a clear
showing of the danger of arbitrary enforcement)).
31. Id. at 358.
32. Id.
33. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
34. Id. at 47.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
gang members, it effectively left complete discretion to the police to
arrest almost anyone. Zeroing in on the ordinance's definition of
loitering as "to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose,"
Justice Stevens parroted the finding of the Illinois Supreme Court-
that this definition "provides absolute discretion to police officers to
decide what activities constitute loitering."35  This invitation to
arbitrary enforcement, along with the ordinance's failure to give
adequate notice of what was prohibited and what was not,36 led the
Court to find that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague.
From this brief survey, one can see that the vagueness doctrine
began with an exclusive focus on whether the law in question
provided adequate notice to the ordinary citizen of what was
prohibited and what was permitted. It eventually expanded to
include a prong focusing on whether the language of the statute or
ordinance invited arbitrary or selective enforcement. Although the
Court never abandoned the notice prong of the vagueness doctrine, it
is fair to say that later decisions paid more attention to the arbitrary
enforcement prong.
B. Johnson v. United States
It was thus a bit surprising that Justice Scalia's opinion in
Johnson said almost nothing about arbitrary enforcement. Perhaps
the Court believed that beat cops do not exercise any discretion when
it comes to sentencing enhancement statutes-though it seems quite
likely that they do think about such things when deciding whether to
pick up known ex-convicts for firearm possession. Moreover, under
the residual clause, federal prosecutors did have discretion to plead
certain prior felony convictions that they had not been able to
shoehorn into the other definitions of "violent felony" or "serious
drug offense."3 7 There was an arbitrary enforcement argument to be
made, if the Court had wanted to make it.
Some academics have criticized the arbitrary enforcement prong
of the vagueness doctrine. Noting the indispensability of beat cop
discretion in the just enforcement of everyday ordinances, Professor
Albert Hill has argued that widespread condemnation of laws on the
basis of arbitrary enforcement would have the unfortunate effect of
35. Id. at 61 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 63 (I11. 1997)).
36. Morales, 527 U.S. at 60 ("[T]he entire ordinance fails to give the ordinary citizen
adequate notice of what is forbidden and what is permitted.").
37. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
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encouraging the blanket enforcement of, for example, traffic laws.38
Professor Debra Livingston has argued that limiting police discretion
by making statutes more clear is "hopeless," noting that some
extremely broad laws are nonetheless clear, and that such laws will
always leave police with broad discretion.39 Andrew Goldsmith has
suggested that these critiques might be addressed by limiting the
arbitrary enforcement prong to statutes that particularly invite
arbitrary enforcement rather than to all statutes.4° It is possible that
the Johnson Court's omission of any discussion of the arbitrary
enforcement prong reflects doubts about its correctness, but
intelligent speculation may have to await more clues.
Johnson began its analysis with Kolender's statement of the rule,
which has become the black-letter law. "Our cases establish that the
Government violates this guarantee by taking away someone's life,
liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give
ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so
standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement," stated Justice
Scalia.4' Without further elaboration of this rule, he then stated that
the law of vagueness applies "not only to statutes defining elements
of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences."
42
The Court then went straight into a description of the so-called
"categorical approach" to determining whether prior convictions
qualify under the ACCA. The landmark decision is Taylor v. United
States, in which the defendant's alleged third strike was a Missouri
burglary conviction.43 Burglary is enumerated in § 924(e)(2), 4 so one
38. Alfred Hill, Vagueness and Police Discretion: The Supreme Court in a Bog, 51
RUTGERS L. REV. 1289, 1307 (1999). Another example used by Professor Hill, blanket
enforcement of domestic violence laws, probably would not engender as widespread
societal outrage as with traffic laws.
39. Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 593 (1997).
40. Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279 (2003).
41. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015) (citing Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983)).
42. Id. at 2557 (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)).
43. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 578 (1990).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006) (stating in pertinent part: "[T]he term 'violent
felony' means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or
any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife or
destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such a term if committed
by an adult, that-is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or
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might think that there would be no question as to whether the
conviction qualified. But the Taylor Court explained that the analysis
was not so simple. The courts could not simply take a nominal
approach to burglary-that is, could not simply count the conviction
as burglary on the ground that Missouri called it burglary.45 After all,
every state has its own burglary statute, with major variations
regarding which places can be burglarized. Congress could not have
wanted all sorts of different statutes counted as burglary simply
because the state legislatures chose to use that label.46
Thus, the Taylor Court adopted a generic form of burglary for
ACCA analysis. If a state version of burglary contained all the
elements of this generic federal target, then convictions under that
statute would count as burglary; if not, then not. But the adoption of
a generic federal form of burglary quickly provoked another issue,
namely, how to determine whether a given conviction meets the
elements in the generic form. For example, Taylor's generic form of
burglary requires that the place of the burglary be a fixed structure
and not a car, boat, or airplane.47 Yet in some states people can be
convicted of "burglary" for unlawfully entering cars, boats, or
airplanes with the intent to commit crimes therein. Do those
convictions count?
There are two principal methods of making that determination.
One would be to look at the real conduct-the actual facts-
underlying the burglary conviction. If, for example, the defendant's
lawyer admitted at the plea hearing that the place of the burglary was
a house or a store, then the conviction would count. Or if something
else in the record showed that the place of the burglary was a fixed
structure, then the conviction would count. In the real world,
however, the record does not always contain competent evidence of
the precise nature and place of the burglary, which means the "real
conduct" or "actual facts" approach would often require mini-trials of
old convictions to determine the applicability of the ACCA.48
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.... (emphasis added)).
45. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 592 ("We think that 'burglary' in 924(e) must have some
uniform definition independent of the labels employed by the various States' criminal
codes.").
46. Id. at 590-91.
47. Id. at 599 ("building or structure").
48. Id. at 601. See also Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2287 (2013).
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Eschewing this method as impractical, Taylor instead adopted a
categorical approach.49  With respect to burglaries, courts are to
examine the state statute of conviction. If the statute permits
convictions for burglaries of places other than fixed structures, then
all convictions under that statute are categorically disqualified (even
if it is clear that this particular burglary took place in a fixed
structure). In this way, federal sentencing courts are not required to
retry cases, many of which were commited long ago and far away.
So far, so good. But the exact Taylor approach was not available
to the courts in residual clause cases because the residual clause
enumerates no felonies, such as burglary or extortion. It is not
possible for courts to develop a "generic" version of a residual clause
felony, because such a felony could be any felony presenting a
"serious potential risk of physical injury to another."50 Therefore, a
"minimum conduct" approach as used in Taylor was not possible. If
the residual clause were to be treated on a categorical basis, as with
the rest of the ACCA, then it would have to be on an "ordinary
commission" approach. That is, courts would have to determine what
the ordinary commission of the felony in question looks like. What
facts underlie the ordinary commission of driving under the
influence? What facts underlie the ordinary commission of attempted
burglary? What facts underlie the ordinary commission of using a
motor vehicle to elude a police officer? Once such hypothetical facts
were determined, they could be tested to determine whether they
presented the "serious potential risk" of injury.
There is, however, an inherent arbitrariness to imagining the
ordinary commissions of felonies. In James v. United States, where
the question was whether attempted burglary in Florida posed a
serious potential risk of injury, the Court said yes, reasoning that the
ordinary attempted burglary may be more dangerous than the
ordinary completed burglary because the typical attempted burglary
that is actually prosecuted has ended in "confrontation with a
property owner or law enforcement officer."'" In Chambers v. United
States, the felony at issue was failure to report to a penal institution
under Illinois law.52 The majority concluded that this felony did not
49. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 590.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
51. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 204 (2007), overruled by Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
52. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 127 (2009).
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fall within the residual clause, in large part because "an individual
who fails to report would seem unlikely, not likely, to call attention to
his whereabouts by simultaneously engaging in additional violent and
unlawful conduct."53 In Sykes v. United States, the felony at issue was
vehicular flight from a police officer under Indiana law.54 The Court
imagined the following scenario as typical:
It is well known that when offenders use motor
vehicles as their means of escape they create serious
potential risks of physical injury to others. Flight from
a law enforcement officer invites, even demands,
pursuit. As that pursuit continues, the risk of an
accident accumulates. And having chosen to flee, and
thereby commit a crime, the perpetrator has all the
more reason to seek to avoid capture.55
In theory, statistics could have made the "ordinary commission"
approach less arbitrary, and in fact the Court used them where
available.56 But availability proved to be the problem. The Court's
data were coming from all different sources, with different gathering
methodologies.57 In dissent, Justice Scalia derided this eclectic
approach to statistics. "The Court does not reveal why it chose one
dataset over another. In sum, our statistical analysis in ACCA cases
is untested judicial factfinding masquerading as statutory
interpretation," he complained. The available data was not nearly
scomprehensive enough to take the arbitrariness out of the analysis-
53. Id. at 128.
54. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011), overruled by Johnson, 135 S. Ct.
2551.
55. Id. at 2274.
56. See Chambers, 555 U.S. at 128-30; Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2274-76.
57. The Sykes Court relied on the following statistical sources: NAT'L CENTER FOR
STATISTICS & ANALYSIS, FATALITIES IN MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC CRASHES
INVOLVING POLICE IN PURSUIT (2010); C. LUM & G. FACHNER, POLICE PURSUITS IN AN
AGE OF INNOVATION AND REFORM (2008); SHANNON CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, VICTIMIZATION DURING HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY (Sept. 2010); U.S. FIRE
ADMINISTRATION, METHODOLOGY USED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOPICAL FIRE
RESEARCH SERIES, http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/tfrs/methodology.pdf (last
visited by the Court June 3, 2011).
58. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2286 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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a somber realization to which a majority 9 of the justices finally came
in Johnson.60
In his Johnson majority opinion, Justice Scalia carefully
explained that the residual clause was not vague merely because
"serious potential risk" feels too subjective or open-ended. In its bid
to save the residual clause, the government cited dozens of state and
federal statutes using similar locutions: "substantial risk," "grave
risk," and "unreasonable risk.",6' The government's implication was
clear: if the Court were to declare the residual clause
unconstitutionally vague, then all these similarly worded statutes
would go down with it.
But Justice Scalia had a ready answer. The residual clause was
vague because, given the categorical approach, it hinged the concept
of risk onto hypothetical facts. It was not vague on the ground that
the concept of risk is inherently vague. It was vague because the
residual clause, viewed through the "ordinary commission" lens,
required judges to imagine a set of facts and then to determine
whether that imagined set of facts presented a serious risk of injury:
Two features of the residual clause conspire to
make it unconstitutionally vague. In the first place,
the residual clause leaves grave uncertainty about how
to estimate the risk posed by a crime. It ties the
judicial assessment of risk to a judicially imagined
59. Justice Alito alone would have saved the residual clause from vagueness by
switching to an actual facts approach. He did not explain how such an approach could be
carried out without the need of retrying the facts underlying prior convictions in many of
the cases. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2578-79 (Alito, J., dissenting).
60. I, along with two social scientist colleagues, searched diligently for a database or
databases that could provide sufficient guidance to support a statistical analysis of
"ordinary commission." See Evan T. Lee, Lynn A. Addington & Stephen D. Rushin,
Which Felonies Pose a "Serious Potential Risk of Injury" for Federal Sentencing Purposes?,
26 FED. SENT'G. REP. 118 (Dec. 2013). Although our long and relatively fruitless search
for such databases was not documented in the article, the research included emails to
crime statistics agencies in all fifty states and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, along
with follow-up telephone calls to many of them. We were told by virtually every agency
that injury statistics for individual crimes are generally not collected or tabulated. Based
on this research, and acknowledging that agencies may treat injury data differently than
fatality data, I am skeptical that a database presently exists that could support an empirical
approach to determining which California felonies are "inherently dangerous to human
life."
61. Supplemental Brief for Respondent, Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551
(2015), No. 13-7120.
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"ordinary case" of a crime, not to real-world facts or
statutory elements. How does one go about deciding
what kind of conduct the "ordinary case" of a crime
involves? "A statistical analysis of the state reporter?
A survey? Expert evidence? Google? Gut instinct?"
To take an example, does the ordinary instance of
witness tampering involve offering a witness a bribe?
Or threatening a witness with violence? Critically,
picturing the criminal's behavior is not enough; as we
have already discussed, assessing "potential risk"
seemingly requires the judge to imagine how the
idealized ordinary case of the crime subsequently plays
out ....
At the same time, the residual clause leaves
uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to
qualify as a violent felony. It is one thing to apply an
imprecise "serious potential risk" standard to real-
world facts; it is quite another to apply it to a judge-
imagined abstraction. By asking whether the crime
"otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk," moreover, the residual clause forces
courts to interpret "serious potential risk" in light of
the four enumerated crimes-burglary, arson,
extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives.
These offenses are "far from clear in respect to the
degree of risk each poses." Does the ordinary burglar
invade an occupied home by night or an unoccupied
home by day? Does the typical extortionist threaten
his victim in person with the use of force, or does he
threaten his victim by mail with the revelation of
embarrassing personal information? By combining
indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by
a crime with indeterminacy about how much risk it
takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony, the
residual clause produces more unpredictability and
arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.62
62. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557-58 (citations omitted).
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Justice Scalia then cited the Court's own interpretive struggles
with the residual clause as an independent ground for finding
vagueness:
This Court has acknowledged that the failure of
"persistent efforts .. . to establish a standard" can
provide evidence of vagueness. Here, this Court's
repeated attempts and repeated failures to craft a
principled and objective standard out of the residual
clause confirm its hopeless indeterminacy....
It has been said that the life of the law is
experience. Nine years' experience trying to derive
meaning from the residual clause convinces us that we
have embarked upon a failed enterprise. 3
Thus, Johnson's vagueness analysis turns on one main factor and
two factors of lesser importance. The main factor is the intersection
of risk and hypothetical facts. The less important factors are (1)
juxtaposition to enumerated felonies, inviting comparison; and (2)
repeated judicial failures to craft a principled and objective standard.
It is not clear how much less important these secondary factors are,
but for purposes of the California second-degree felony-murder rule
it doesn't matter. All three factors are abundantly present in
California's "inherently dangerous felony" rule as it currently exists.
With respect to juxtaposition to enumerated felonies, Johnson
says the following:
What is more, the inclusion of burglary and extortion
among the enumerated offenses preceding the residual
clause confirms that the court's task also goes beyond
evaluating the chances that the physical acts that make
up the crime will injure someone. The act of making
an extortionate demand or breaking and entering into
someone's home does not, in and of itself, normally
cause physical injury. Rather, risk of injury arises
because the extortionist might engage in violence after
making his demand or because the burglar might
63. Id. at 2558, 2560 (citation omitted).
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confront a resident in the home after breaking and
entering. 64
In other words, the unpredictability of the residual clause is
compounded by the inclusion of enumerated felonies as comparitors
because it requires a court to gauge the risk of those comparitors as
well-something that cannot be done without comprehensive
statistics.
C. California Case Law on Vagueness
It is certainly the prerogative of a state supreme court to construe
individual rights under its state constitution more broadly than the
federal Supreme Court does under the federal Constitution. Thus,
the CSC could interpret article I, section 7 of the California
Constitution to provide a more robust protection against vague
criminal statutes than do federal precedents. As it happens, though
the CSC's vagueness precedents closely track those of the USSC; the
CSC has really not had much original to say about vagueness.
Therefore, we need not spend a great deal of time surveying
California vagueness law.
One of the leading cases is Williams v. Garcetti.65 There, the CSC
rejected vagueness and overbreadth challenges to a California statute
authorizing misdemeanor punishment for any one who "commits any
act or omits any duty causing, encouraging, or contributing to the
dependency or delinquency of a minor." 66 An amendment to the
statute provided that, for the purposes of the quoted section, parents
or guardians "shall have the duty to exercise reasonable care,
supervision, protection, and control" over their children. 6 The issue
before the CSC was whether the amendment made the statute
unconstitutionally vague. The Court stated:
The constitutional interest implicated in questions
of statutory vagueness is that no person be deprived of
"life, liberty, or property without due process of law,"
as assured by both the federal Constitution (U.S.
Const., Amends. V, XIV) and the California
64. Id. at 2557 (emphasis deleted).
65. Williams v. Garcetti, 5 Cal. 4th 561 (1993).
66. CAL. PEN. CODE § 272 (2015).
67. Garcetti, 5 Cal. 4th at 565.
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Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7). Under both
constitutions, due process of law in this context
requires two elements: a criminal statute must "be
definite enough to provide (1) a standard of conduct
for those whose activities are proscribed and (2) a
standard for police enforcement and for ascertainment
of guilt.68
This statement of the rule mimics the USSC's black-letter
statement in Kolender and in subsequent cases.69 The first prong
focuses on notice to the ordinary citizen: The statute's language must
set forth some ascertainable standard to which the citizen can
conform his or her behavior. "Vague laws may trap the innocent by
not providing fair warning," the Garcetti Court explained °.7  The
second prong focuses on avoiding arbitrary enforcement. If the
statute contains no standard for enforcement, it can be said to invite
arbitrary or selective enforcement. The Court elaborated, "[a] vague
law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges,
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.,
71
Given that the statute only authorized punishment upon proof of
criminal negligence, which requires a gross deviation from normal
care, the statute's standard of "reasonable" care and supervision was
not unconstitutionally vague].
Another oft-cited CSC case concerning vagueness is People v.
Superior Court (Caswell) , which involved a state loitering statute:
any person "who loiters in or about any toilet open to the public for
the purpose of engaging in or soliciting any lewd or lascivious or any
68. Id. at 567 (citing Walker v. Super. Ct., 47 Cal.3d 112, 141 (1988) and Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
69. See, e.g., Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357; City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 63
(I11. 997).
70. Garcetti, 5 Cal. 4th at 567.
71. Id. at 567-68 (1993) (quoting Cranston v. City of Richmond, 40 Cal. 3d 755, 763
(1985)).
72. Id. at 574. The Court also concluded that the statute did not invite arbitrary
enforcement. "Although the amendment calls for sensitive judgment in both enforcement
and adjudication, we would not be justified in assuming that police, prosecutors, and juries
are unable to exercise such judgment." Id. at 577.
73. People v. Super. Ct. (Caswell), 46 Cal. 3d 1361 (1988).
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unlawful act" is guilty of a misdemeanor.74 Again, the Court stated
that the test for vagueness involves a notice aspect and an arbitrary
enforcement aspect. "First, a statute must be sufficiently definite to
provide adequate notice of the conduct proscribed," the Court
stated.75  "Second, a statute must provide sufficiently definite
guidelines for the police in order to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.
7 6
With respect to notice, the Court stressed that this loitering
statute contains a specific intent requirement. Without the requisite
"purpose of engaging in or soliciting" a lewd, lascivious, or unlawful
act, there could be no liability. The word "loiter" might be
susceptible to multiple interpretations. However, the requirement of
specific intent prevents truly innocent people from doubting their
liability. "Persons of ordinary intelligence need not guess at the
applicability of the section; so long as they do not linger for the
proscribed purpose, they have not violated the statute," the Court
stated.7
Regarding arbitrary enforcement, the Court distinguished
Kolender. The need to produce "reliable and credible" evidence
upon police demand, made the loitering ordinance in Kolender
subject to the "personal standards of each individual law enforcement
officer., 78 By contrast, the loitering ordinance involved in Caswell
vested "no such discretion with law enforcement." "A person is
subject to arrest under the provision only if his or her conduct gives
rise to probable cause to believe that he or she is loitering in or about
a public restroom with the proscribed illicit intent," the Court stated.79
There are, of course, other CSC cases involving challenges to
statutes and ordinances on vagueness grounds.s° Unsurprisingly, they
74. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(d) (2015).
75. Caswell, 46 Cal. 3d at 389.
76. Id. at 390.
77. Id. at 391.
78. Id. at 394.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., People v. Heitzman, 9 Cal. 4th 189 (1994) (elderly abuse statute not
vague); Burg v. Municipal Court, 35 Cal. 3d 57 (1983) (driving under the influence statute
not vague); but see People v. Barksdale, 8 Cal. 3d 320 (1972) (provision in Therapeutic
Abortion Act that employed "substantial risk" standard was unconstitutionally vague).
Although the statute in Barksdale bears a superficial resemblance to the residual clause's
"serious potential risk" provision, it is only superficial, as the abortion law did not involve
the kind of double or compounded uncertainty upon which Justice Scalia's Johnson
opinion rests.
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all hew closely to the USSC precedents surveyed earlier. They do not
add appreciably to the nuance in vagueness analysis, but rather,
merely apply the established standards to different statutes and
ordinances. It is time to examine the precise way in which
California's second-degree felony-murder rule runs afoul of
vagueness law, and Johnson in particular.
II. California's Second-Degree Felony-Murder Rule
A. The Structure of CPC Sections 187-89
California's murder statute spans several provisions. Both the
first-degree and second-degree felony-murder doctrines involve some
form of inference from the structure of the statute; neither is set forth
in so many words.8 Section 187 states, "Murder is the unlawful killing
of another human being, or fetus, with malice aforethought."
' '
Section 188 defines malice as follows: "Such malice may be express or
implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention
unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied,
when no considerable provocation appears, or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant
heart."'83 Felony-murder, then, is a form of implied malice murder.
Section 189 states as follows:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of a
destructive device or explosive, a weapon of mass
destruction, knowing use of ammunition designed
primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison, lying in
wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is
committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary,
mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act
punishable under Section 206, 286, 288, 288a, or 289,
or any murder which is perpetrated by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle,
intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle
81. See People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 472 (1983) (characterizing the CSC first-
degree felony-murder rule as the product of "piling inference upon inference").
82. CAL. PEN. CODE § 187 (2015).
83. CAL. PEN. CODE § 188 (2015).
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with the intent to inflict death, is murder of the first
degree. All other kinds of murders are of the second
degree.84
As a matter of first impression, section 189 appears purely as a
grading provision. Section 187 holds the actual proscription of
primary conduct, making killings with "malice" punishable as murder.
Section 189 contains an exhaustive list of "murder[s]" that are to be
punished as first-degree, with a residual clause stating that "[a]ll other
kinds of murders" are to be punished as second-degree. If section 189
stated that "all killing which is perpetrated by" various means "is
murder of the first-degree," then the first-degree felony-murder rule
would be explicit. By the same token, if it said that "all other kinds of
killings" are second-degree murders, there would be no need to infer
anything. But section 189 does not say that; it limits its scope to
whatever is already made "murder" by section 187.
The interpretation of section 189 has, however, long ceased to be
a matter of first impression. At least as far back as 1983, in People v.
Dillon, the CSC established that the first-degree felony-murder rule is
a creation of statute and that the second-degree felony-murder rule is
the product of common law.85 While acknowledging that the first-
degree felony-murder rule results from "piling inference upon
inference," the Court squarely held that the rule is created by
statute8 At the same time, the Court characterized the second-
degree felony-murder rule as a "judge-made doctrine without any
express basis in the Penal Code." Prior to that, in 1966, the CSC had
tacitly admitted that the second-degree felony-murder rule was a
creature of common law: "Despite defendant's contention that the
Penal Code does not expressly set forth any provision for second
degree felony murder and that, therefore, we should not follow any
such doctrine here, the concept lies imbedded in our law." '
The common law status of the second-degree felony-murder rule
has been confirmed more recently. In 2005, the Court handed down
People v. Howard, in which it held that driving in willful or wanton
84. CAL. PEN. CODE § 189 (2015).
85. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 472.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 582 (1966), overruled by People v. Flood, 18
Cal. 4th 470 (1998).
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disregard of the safety of others while fleeing a police officer is not
inherently dangerous to human life for purposes of the second-degree
felony-murder rule.89 "Because the second degree felony-murder rule
is a court-made rule, it has no statutory definition, ' 9" stated Justice
Kennard for the Court. The Court had said as much the year before:
"The second-degree felony-murder rule is a common law doctrine."
91
But in 2009 the Court abruptly changed course. In People v.
Sarun Chun, the CSC offered an historical explanation for the
conclusion that the second-degree felony-murder rule is a statutory
creation after all.' "[T]he second degree felony-murder rule,
although derived from the common law, is based on statute; it is
simply another interpretation of section 188's abandoned and
malignant heart language," 93 stated Justice Chin for the Court. He
continued:
Even conscious-disregard-for-life malice is non-
statutory in the limited sense that no California statute
specifically uses those words. But that form of implied
malice is firmly based on statute; it is an interpretation
of section 188's abandoned and malignant heart
language. Similarly, the second degree felony-murder
rule is nonstatutory in the sense that no statute
specifically spells it out, but it is also statutory as
another interpretation of the same "abandoned and
malignant heart" language. We have said that the
"felony-murder rule eliminates the need for proof of
malice in connection with a charge of murder, thereby
rendering irrelevant the presence or absence of actual
malice, both with regard to first degree felony murder
and second degree felony murder." But analytically,
this is not precisely correct. The felony-murder rule
renders irrelevant conscious-disregard-for-life malice,
but it does not render malice itself irrelevant. Instead,
the felony-murder rule "acts as a substitute" for
89. People v. Howard, 34 Cal. 4th 1129 (2005).
90. Id. at 1135.
91. People v. Robertson, 34 Cal. 4th 156 (2004), overruled by People v. Sarun Chun
45 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009).
92. People v. Sarun Chun, 45 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009).
93. Id. at 1183.
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conscious-disregard-for-life malice. It simply describes
a different form of malice under section 188. "The
felony-murder rule imputes the requisite malice for a
murder conviction to those who commit a homicide
during the perpetration of a felony inherently
dangerous to life."
... The "abandoned and malignant heart"
language of both the original 1850 law and today's
section 188 contains within it the common law second
degree felony-murder rule. The willingness to commit
a felony inherently dangerous to life is a circumstance
showing an abandoned and malignant heart. The
second degree felony-murder rule is based on statute
and, accordingly, stands on firm constitutional
ground.94
Since 2009, then, the second-degree felony-murder rule has been
regarded as a creation of statute-or, more accurately, as a statutory
codification of common law. In my view, the reasoning of Chun is
less than airtight; what makes the Court think that the "abandoned
and malignant heart" language does not apply only to the felony-
murders explicitly enumerated in section 189? Chun may well be
correct that "abandoned and malignant heart" denotes a form of
malice less "express" than intent to kill and therefore, that it
encompasses some form of felony-murder. But to conclude that it
includes second-degree felony-murder, with the open-ended
possibility of courts finding new statutory predicates undreamed of by
the Legislature, rather than only the legislatively prescribed
predicates set forth in section 189, is quite a leap. At the most, what
Chun shows is that the interpretation of "abandoned and malignant
heart" as including felony-murder is a permissive reading. It certainly
does not demonstrate that such an interpretation is a mandatory
reading. To set aside so many cases holding to the contrary is a tour
de force indeed.
This is not, however, the place for a complete reexamination of
Chun and its holding that second-degree felony-murder has a
statutory pedigree. This Article's primary conclusion is that the CSC
must now do something about the inherently dangerous felony rule
94. Id. at 1187-88 (citations omitted).
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within second-degree felony-murder, in the wake of Johnson. If a
majority of justices believe that the rule must be saved by switching to
a "real conduct" or "actual facts" approach to "inherently dangerous
felony," then that will cure the constitutional problem. One can
agree with my diagnosis that the current rule has become
unconstitutionally vague, yet disagree with my preferred remedy, that
the second-degree felony-murder doctrine be overruled. Thus, I
leave fuller consideration of the second-degree felony-murder's
pedigree to another day.
B. The "Inherently Dangerous Felony" Doctrine
An unrestricted version of the felony-murder rule would be
harsh indeed. If, for example, someone suffered a fatal heart attack
from the shock of witnessing someone else commit a crime of grand
theft, mail or wire fraud, perjury, or even felony trespass, the felon
might be guilty of murder. A death following one of these felonies
seems less than foreseeable, and perhaps the prosecutor would
exercise discretion not to charge murder in such a circumstance, or
perhaps the jury would decline to convict of murder. But the criminal
law should not leave it entirely to prosecutors and juries to make sure
that defendants undeserving of punishment for murder do not in fact
receive that punishment. The dangerous felony requirement
smoothens the harsh edge off the basic felony-murder rule.
The origin of the dangerous felony requirement in America is
sometimes attributed to reception from English common law.95 The
original English rule is said to have held a defendant liable for felony-
murder without regard to whether the underlying felony was
dangerous.96 The earliest CSC cases tended toward silence as to why
various felonies qualified as predicates for the felony-murder rule.
The 191.4 decision in People v. Wright, for example, held that death
resulting from an illegal abortion was second-degree felony-murder.9
There was no mention of why abortion qualified as a predicate felony.
In 1931, in People v. McIntyre, the Court assumed that driving under
the influence qualified as a predicate for second-degree felony-
95. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 785-86 § 14.5(a) (5th ed. 2010).
96. Id. at 785. But see Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder
Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59 (2004) (calling the harsh original rule a myth).
97. People v. Wright, 167 Cal. 1 (1914).
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murder.98 Again, there was no analysis of why driving under the
influence counted as a predicate.
People v. Poindexter demonstrates that the CSC's original
approach to inherent dangerousness was to focus on the actual facts
of the case.99 The defendant had furnished heroin to a minor, who
died. The Court stated, "Here there was uncontroverted testimony
that [the victim] died from narcotics poisoning, and that taking a shot
of heroin was an act dangerous to human life. ' °° It is hard to know
how seriously to take this sentence. Taken literally, the Court is
saying that it was proper for the trial court to allow testimony on
whether a shot of heroin is dangerous to human life, which would
mean that the dangerousness question was treated as a question of
actual adjudicative fact, not as an "abstract" question of law. On the
other hand, it could have been a slip of the pen; the deadly quality of
narcotics overdoses have long been well known.
Although People v. Williams1°1 is sometimes credited with the
beginning of the abstract approach to inherent dangerousness in
California," 2 the first real explication of it appears in People v.Phillips.°3 The Phillips Court stated:
We have held ... that only such felonies as are in
themselves "inherently dangerous to human life" can
support the application of the felony murder rule. We
have ruled that in assessing such peril to human life
inherent in any given felony "we look to the elements
of the felony in the abstract, not the particular 'facts'
of the case."' '°
The Court was not required to explain why the underlying felony
at bar, grand theft, was not inherently dangerous to human life, as the
prosecution had conceded the point. The prosecution did, however,
98. People v. McIntyre, 213 Cal. 50 (1931).
99. People v. Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d 142 (1958).
100. ld. at 149.
101. People v. Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 452 (1965). See People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615,
621 (1989) (attributing the abstract test to Williams).
102. See People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 38-39 (1971), overruled by People v. Flood,
18 Cal. 4th 470 (1998).
103. People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574 (1966), overruled by People v. Flood, 18 Cal. 4th
470 (1998).
104. Id. at 582 (citation omitted).
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argue for what would have amounted to an "actual facts" approach,
to which the Court replied:
Admitting that grand theft is not inherently
dangerous to life, the prosecution asks us to
encompass the entire course of defendant's conduct so
that we may incorporate such elements as would make
his crime inherently dangerous. In so framing the
definition of a given felony for the purpose of
assessing its inherent peril to life the prosecution
would abandon the statutory definition of the felony
as such and substitute the factual elements of
defendant's actual conduct. In the present case the
Attorney General would characterize that conduct as
"grand theft medical fraud," and this newly created
"felony," he urges, clearly involves danger to human
life and supports an application of the felony murder
rule.
To fragmentize the 'course of conduct' of
defendant so that the felony murder rule applies if any
segment of that conduct may be considered dangerous
to life would widen the rule beyond calculation. It
would then apply not only to the commission of
specific felonies, which are themselves dangerous to
life, but to the perpetration of any felony during which
defendant may have acted in such a manner as to
endanger life.'05
By the time of Phillips, it was clear that the proper approach for
determining dangerousness was "abstract." But which abstract
approach? There are two possible abstract approaches: a "minimum
conduct" (i.e., least risky conduct) approach or an "ordinary
commission" approach." The minimum conduct approach takes a
105: Id. at 583-84.
106. I use the term "minimum conduct" because that term is often used in federal
sentencing and immigration law to describe the categorical approach toward determining
whether prior convictions qualify for either federal sentencing enhancement or removal.
See, e.g., Mendez v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 345, 348 (2d Cir. 2008) (looking to the "minimum
criminal conduct necessary to satisfy the essential elements of the crime"); Amouzadeh v.
Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2006) (considering "the minimum criminal conduct
necessary to sustain conviction under the statute" (citation omitted)).
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theoretical view: "What is the minimum conduct (in terms of
dangerousness) that would nonetheless satisfy the essential elements
of the offense?" By contrast, the other approach takes an empirical
view: "What does the ordinary commission of this offense look like?"
The minimum conduct approach carries an inherent arbitrariness
in its application. What, for example, is the minimum conduct (least
risky or least culpable conduct) that nonetheless satisfies the essential
elements of driving under the influence? Presumably, the minimum
"influence" is the mere threshold of the blood alcohol requirement,
.08%. But what kind of "driving"? Driving while observing all other
traffic laws? How fast? Driving thirty-five miles per hour (mph) in a
thirty-five mph zone? Or, if thirty-two mph in a thirty-five mph zone
is marginally safer, does that then become the "minimum conduct"?
Does the driving take place in heavy traffic, or on desolate back
roads? Night or day? Good weather or bad? Skilled driver or
unskilled? Practiced at driving under the influence or novice?
The "ordinary commission" approach has its own arbitrariness
problems. What does the ordinary or typical commission of an
offense look like? This inquiry dredges up problems similar to those
of the minimum conduct approach, as there is simply no non-arbitrary
way of saying what is ordinary or typical. The one escape from that
arbitrariness would be comprehensive statistics. If we knew what
percentage of driving under the influence crimes resulted in the death
of another person, there would be no need to imagine any facts. But
once we had a percentage, how would we know whether it was high
enough to qualify as "inherently dangerous"?
The subsequent cases bear out these difficulties predictably. In
1971, the CSC decided three cases involving an issue of inherent
dangerousness. In People v. Satchell, the predicate felony was
possession of a concealable weapon by an ex-felon.11 During a street
fight, the defendant retreated to his car, only to produce a sawed-off
shotgun. One blast killed the defendant. He was convicted of
second-degree murder, after the trial court had instructed the jury on
felony-murder. Before convicting, the jury asked the trial judge
multiple questions about the law of second-degree felony-murder,
suggesting that its verdict may have been based on a felony-murder
theory.'°8 The CSC focused its review on the various offenses for
which a felon-in-possession might have been previously convicted. A
107. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d at 32.
108. Id. at 33.
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convicted murderer or drug dealer might be more dangerous with a
concealable firearm than, say, a tax cheat. The Court provided many
examples of prior convictions that would not suggest enhanced
dangerousness in the possessor of a firearm.'°9
Another 1971 decision, People v. Mattison, involved poisoning.11
The defendant and victim were prison inmates. The victim was an
alcoholic and the defendant worked in the prison medical laboratory.
The defendant procured eight ounces of methyl alcohol and provided
it to the victim, who consumed it and died. After being instructed on
first-degree murder by poisoning, second-degree extreme
recklessness murder, second-degree felony-murder, and involuntary
manslaughter, the jury convicted defendant of second-degree
murder."'
On appeal, the defendant argued that he had to have been guilty
of either first-degree murder or nothing. If he poisoned the
defendant on purpose, it had to have been first-degree murder; if the
poisoning was an accident, he had to be acquitted."' The CSC
rejected this argument, finding that there was insufficient evidence to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the intent to
kill or conscious disregard of a high probability of death. However,
the defendant was convicted of violating Penal Code 347, which made
it a felony to "wilfully mingle[] any poison with food, drink, or
medicine, with intent that the same shall be taken by any human
being to his injury.",113 The CSC found that the jury was entitled to
find him guilty of second-degree murder on a felony-murder theory.
Although the Court's main focus was on the issue of whether the
poisoning was "integral to" and "included in fact" within the
109. Id. at 42 n.19 ("See, for example, Corporations Code, sections 3019-3021, 25540
et seq. (fraudulent and deceptive acts relating to corporations); Elections Code, sections
12000 et seq., 14403, 15280, 17090 et seq., 29100 et seq., 29130 et seq., 29160, 29180, 29400,
29430, 29431 (elections offenses); Financial Code, section 18857.1 (unauthorized sale of
investment certificates); Government Code, section 9050 et seq. (interference with the
legislative process), section 9908 (crimes of legislative representatives); Insurance Code,
section 556 (false or fraudulent insurance claim), section 833 (crimes in the issuance of
insurance securities); Military and Veterans Code, section 421 (conversion of military
property); Public Resources Code, section 5190 (interest of park commissioner in park
contract); Vehicle Code, section 4463 (false evidence of registration").
110. People v. Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d 177 (1971).
1ll. Id.atl181-82.
112. Id. at 184.
113. Id.
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homicide, 4 it further noted that the Legislature regarded Penal Code
347 as a dangerous felony. "By making it a felony to administer
poison with the intent to cause any injury," the Court stated, "the
Legislature has evidenced its concern for the dangers involved in such
conduct, and the invocation of the second degree felony-murder rule
in such cases when unforeseen death results serves further to deter
such dangerous conduct.""' 5
In a third 1971 decision, People v. Lopez, the CSC held that
escape from prison was not inherently dangerous to human life, but
again offered no reasoning to support that conclusion." 6 In People v.
Nichols, decided in 1970, the CSC found arson of a motor vehicle to
be inherently dangerous to human life."' Its entire analysis of the
inherent dangerousness issue consisted of the following sentence:
"Certainly the burning of a motor vehicle, which usually contains
gasoline and which is usually found in close proximity to people, is
inherently dangerous to human life.""' Thus, as of 1971, Satchell was
still the only CSC case discursive in its analysis of the test for an
inherently dangerous felony.
The CSC would not discuss the inherently dangerous felony test
again until People v. Burroughs in 1984." 9 The victim, diagnosed with
terminal leukemia, submitted to "treatments" by the defendant, who
held himself out as a "healer.' 20 The treatments included a special
lemonade, exposure to colored lights, and deep abdominal121 Th
massages. The massages caused massive hemorrhaging,
excruciating pain, and eventual death. The defendant was convicted
of second-degree felony-murder on the basis of the predicate felony
of practicing medicine without a license "under circumstances or
conditions which cause or create a risk of great bodily harm, serious
mental or physical illness, or death."122 The Court, per Justice Grodin,
114. Id.; accord People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522 (1969) ("[A] second degree felony-
murder instruction may not properly be given when it is based upon a felony which is an
integral part of the homicide and which the evidence produced by the prosecution shows
to be an offense included in fact within the offense charged.").
115. Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d at 186.
116. People v. Lopez, 6 Cal. 3d 45 (1971).
117. People v. Nichols, 3 Cal. 3d 150 (1970).
118. Id. at 163.
119. People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824 (1984).
120. Id. at 896-98.
121. Id. The defendant also insisted that the victim cut off any contact with his
conventional physician.
122. Id. at 830 (emphasis added).
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reaffirmed that inherent dangerousness must be viewed in the
abstract by analyzing the elements of the predicate felony, not by
looking at the defendant's actual conduct. If the jury were to ask
whether the felony was inherently dangerous based on the actual
facts, "the existence of the dead victim might appear to lead
inexorably to the conclusion that the underlying felony is
exceptionally hazardous.'
23
According to the Burroughs Court, the abstract test called for a
determination of whether the predicate offense "possibly could be
committed without creating [danger to human life]."'24 This was the
minimum conduct approach-what is the minimum conduct, in terms
of danger creation, that nonetheless constitutes a violation of the
statute? Here, the Court concluded, there were numerous ways to be
guilty of practicing medicine without a license that presented minimal
or no risk to human life. "One can certainly conceive of treatment of
the sick or afflicted which has quite innocuous results-the affliction
at stake could be a common cold, or a sprained finger, and the form
of treatment an admonition to rest in bed and drink fluids or the
application of ice to mild swelling," stated the Court.
25
Turning to the phrase "risk of great bodily harm," the Court
stated, "a broken arm or leg would constitute serious bodily injury-
and by implication, great bodily harm as well. While painful and
debilitating, such bone fractures clearly do not, by their nature,
jeopardize the life of the victim. '  Finally, referring to the phrase
"mental illness," the Court stated:
It is not difficult, for example, to envision one who
suffers from delusions of grandeur, believing himself
to be the President of the United States. An
individual who purports without the proper license to
be able to treat such a person need not be placing the
patient's life in jeopardy, though such treatment, if
conducted, for example, without expertise, may lead to
117
the need for more serious psychiatric attention.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 831.
127. Id. at 832.
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Note that the Burroughs Court eschewed any attempt to
ascertain the ordinary or typical commission of practicing medicine
without a license. Burroughs thus adopts the "minimum conduct"
(least risky conduct) approach to inherently dangerous felonies and is
consistent with Satchell-but inconsistent with the "ordinary
commission" test employed in Nichols.
People v. Patterson, handed down in 1989, swings back toward
the ordinary commission approach, albeit somewhat opaquely.28 The
victim, Jenny Licerio, had been using cocaine on a daily basis for
about six months before her death. On the night she died, Licerio
was partying with defendant Patterson and another friend. Patterson
furnished the cocaine, which was ingested in multiple forms. Licerio
died from acute cocaine intoxication.
Patterson pleaded guilty to three counts of violating California
Health & Safety Code section 11352(a), which states:
[E]very person who transports, imports into this state,
sells, furnishes, administers, or gives away, or offers to
transport, import into this state, sell, furnish,
administer, or give away, or attempts to import into
this state or transport (1) any controlled substance...
shall be punished by imprisonment.., for three, four,
129
or five years.
Upon receiving Patterson's guilty plea to the section 11352(a)
charges, the trial court dismissed the murder charge against him. The
Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal. Drawing on the minimum
conduct analyses of Satchell and Burroughs, the Court of Appeals
reasoned that some of the controlled substances covered by section
11352(a) are not inherently dangerous to human life.
The CSC reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennard
explained that whether a violation of section 11352(a) is inherently
dangerous depends upon precisely which substance is involved. The
proper factual field of reference is not just any substance covered by
the provision, but instead the precise substance involved in the case.
The Court insisted that it was using an "abstract" approach-it
expressly rejected the government's argument in favor of an actual
128. People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615 (1989).
129. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352(a).
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facts approach.' 3 The proper quantum or threshold of risk was "high
probability,""13 Justice Kennard stated. Does furnishing cocaine pose
a high probability of death, viewed in the abstract? Answering that
question would involve a statistical analysis, which should be
performed in the first instance by a trial court on remand.
Ascertaining Patterson's rule requires some parsing The Court's
primary focus was on the establishment of a "high probability"
threshold of risk. The Court did not focus on the proper factual field
of reference, except to say that, in the context of section 11352(a), the
proper reference was the specific drug involved in the case at bar, and
not all drugs covered by the statute.'32 On the surface, that latter
holding appears as a limited form of "actual facts" or "real conduct"
analysis, but the appearance is misleading. The Court adamantly
insisted that it was sticking to an abstract approach, explicitly
rejecting the government's plea for an actual facts approach. What
the Court meant was that section 11352(a) is divisible, which is to say,
it contains as many different offenses as substances it covers.' 3  The
correct factual field of reference was an abstract conception of the
precise offense with which Patterson was charged-furnishing
cocaine. The Court did not look at the particular way in which
Patterson furnished the cocaine, but instead made it clear that
statistical analysis should be conducted on remand.
The Patterson Court's endorsement of statistical analysis
confirms two things. First, it demonstrates that the analysis is
abstract, for society-wide statistics about the incidence of death
involved in the ingestion of cocaine tells us very little about what
happened in the case at bar. Second, endorsement of statistical
analysis shows that the Court tacitly accepted an ordinary commission
field of reference rather than a minimum conduct field of reference.
A court truly concerned with minimum conduct, such as in Satchell or
Burroughs, is not interested in statistics because they are not
probative of the least dangerous manner in which the felony can be
committed. A minimum conduct analysis necessarily involves
130. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 620-21.
131. Id. at 618.
132. Id. at 625.
133. Cf Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 (2013) (holding that, when
determining which prior convictions qualify as "violent felonies" under the federal Armed
Career Criminal Act, courts may look at the facts only for the limited purpose of
ascertaining which portion of a divisible criminal statute the defendant was actually
convicted under).
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conjuring hypotheticals designed to minimize risk, then asking
whether that hypothesized minimized risk nonetheless breaks
through the threshold for "inherent dangerousness to human life."
That is why the Court in Satchell and Burroughs made no mention of
statistics. Patterson, by contrast, did remand for trial court
consideration of statistics, which can only be probative as to the
'"average" or "ordinary" commission of the offense in question.
The CSC stayed with the Patterson high-probability-in-the-
ordinary-commission approach in People v. Hansen.'34 Hansen had
given $40 to one Echaves, who had promised to procure some
methamphetamine for Hansen. When Echaves never came back,
Hansen went to Echaves' apartment and banged on the door several
times. No one answered. Hours later, when Hansen still had not
heard back from Echaves, he drove back to the apartment and shot at
it from his car. One of the bullets struck and killed a girl who was
sitting in the living room with her brother.'35
Then-Justice George wrote for the Court, holding that shooting
into an inhabited dwelling house was inherently dangerous to human
life. From the opinion, it is very clear that the Court's factual field of
reference consisted of ordinary commissions of the felony, not the
minimum conduct necessary to commit the felony:
The discharge of a firearm at an inhabited dwelling
house-by definition, a dwelling "currently being used
for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not" (§
246)-is a felony whose commission inherently
involves a danger to human life. An inhabited
dwelling house is one in which persons reside and
where occupants "are generally in or around the
premises." In firing a gun at such a structure, there
always will exist a significant likelihood that an
occupant may be present. Although it is true that a
defendant may be guilty of this felony even if, at the
time of the shooting, the residents of the inhabited
dwelling happen to be absent the offense nonetheless
is one that, viewed in the abstract-as shooting at a
structure that currently is used for dwelling purposes-
134. People v. Hanson, 9 Cal. 4th 300 (1994), overruled by People v. Sarun Chun 45
Cal. 4th 1172 (2009).
135. Id. at 305-06.
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poses a great risk or "high probability" of death within
the meaning of Patterson."'
It is critical to note that Hansen is not merely based on a
common-sense view that shooting at an apartment could kill
someone, for if the Court had followed the minimum conduct
approach taken in Satchell or Burroughs, the result might well have
been different. Is it not possible for a drug dealer to break into an
apartment looking for someone who owes him money, search the
apartment from stem to stern, and, finding no one there, fire a shot
back into the apartment out of frustration? If that scenario is
possible, can it fairly be said that that act of shooting into the
apartment is dangerous to human life, given that the house was
searched exhaustively and yet no one was found in there? One could
not honestly say there is a high probability of killing someone in that
situation. Hansen comes out differently because the Court was not
interested in hypothesizing the minimum conduct necessary to violate
Penal Code section 246. Rather, the Court was interested in the
ordinary or average commission of that offense.'37
By 2004, Justice George had become Chief Justice, but he was
still writing for the Court on whether shooting offenses are inherently
dangerous. In People v. Robertson, defendant Quincy Robertson was
watching television with his family in his Oakland apartment when he
heard a loud noise just outside. 18 He grabbed his gun and emerged to
find four intoxicated youths stealing the hubcaps off his parked car.
When they fled, Robertson fired a shot at them. As they continued to
run, Robertson walked into the middle of the street, fired nine more
rounds, striking one of them in the back of the head and killing him.
According to one eyewitness, Robertson then "swaggered" back into
the apartment building.139 It was the third time someone had broken
into or vandalized one of Robertson's parked vehicles.
The jury convicted Robertson of second-degree murder after
being instructed that they could base such a verdict on a finding that
he had violated Penal Code section 246.3, discharging a firearm in a
grossly negligent manner. The CSC affirmed, agreeing with an earlier
136. Id. at 310 (citations omitted).
137. Justice George said nothing about homicide statistics for shooting into buildings,
which probably are not gathered.
138. People v. Robertson, 34 Cal. 4th 156 (2004), overruled by People v. Sarun Chun
45 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009).
139. Id. at 162.
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Court of Appeal decision holding section 246.3 inherently dangerous
to human life. Chief Justice George stated:
"The tragic death of innocent and often random
victims.., as the result of the discharge of firearms,
has become an alarmingly common occurrence in our
society-a phenomenon of enormous concern to the
public." The [Court of Appeal] reasoned that the
offense is inherently dangerous because it involves
discharge of the highly lethal instrumentality of a
firearm with gross negligence in a manner that "could
result in injury or death to a person" (§ 246.3). It
added that '[i]mminent deadly consequences [are]
inherent in the act' [citation] even if the bullet
fortuitously falls so as to injure and not kill." By its
terms, the statute "presupposes that there are people
in harm's way" and that a reasonable person in
defendant's situation would have "reasonable grounds
to suspect that people will be endangered.' °0
Robertson does not tell us much about the proper factual field of
reference, as either mode of analysis ends up in the same place with
this particular offense. Certainly the ordinary or average discharge of
a firearm in a grossly negligent manner is dangerous to human life.
Yet even the minimum (least risky or least culpable) conduct
necessary to violate this statute is dangerous to human life, given that
there must be (1) discharge of a firearm; and (2) it must be in a
factual context where a reasonable person should have been aware of
an extremely substantial risk that someone could be harmed. Not
even a law professor could dream up a fact pattern in which someone
fires a gun in a grossly negligent manner where it is extremely
unlikely that an innocent person will be killed, for if it is extremely
unlikely that the shot will harm anyone, it is not grossly negligent.
Therefore, with respect to section 246.3, it does not matter which
factual field of reference one uses; the result will be that the felony is
inherently dangerous. The Robertson Court did not have to choose.
The CSC's next inherently dangerous felony decision was People
v. Howard.'41 In the early morning hours of May 23, 2002, defendant
140. Id. at 168-69 (citations omitted).
141. People v. Howard, 34 Cal. 4th 1129 (2005).
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Howard was stopped by officers of the California Highway Patrol for
not having a rear license plate. As the officers alighted from their
vehicle, Howard restarted his engine and sped off, precipitating a
chase that reached ninety mph. During this chase through a rural
area, Howard shut off his headlights, ran two stop signs, and crossed
over to the wrong side of the road. When Howard got close to
downtown Fresno, however, the officers ceased their pursuit, fearing
an accident. But it was too late. Shortly after they gave up the chase,
the officers saw Howard's Chevrolet Tahoe run a red light and collide
with a car driven by Jeanette Rodriguez, who was killed. It turned
out that the Tahoe had been stolen earlier in the day. Howard's
blood was tested and showed a high level of methamphetamine.
Victim Rodriguez's blood was also tested and found to contain both
heroin and cocaine.
The jury was instructed that it could convict Howard of second-
degree felony-murder if it concluded that Rodriguez was killed during
a violation of California Vehicle Code section 2800.2, which makes it
a felony to "driv[e] in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of
persons or property while fleeing from a pursuing peace officer." The
trial court did not instruct on any other theory of malice, which is to
say, it did not instruct on malice as conscious disregard of an extreme
risk to human life (colloquially referred to as "implied malice
murder"). If it were to convict for murder, then the jury would have
to convict on a felony-murder theory. During its deliberations, the
jury sent the trial judge a note asking, "It appears in the instructions if
there is a guilty verdict [in section] 2800.2 then there must be a guilty
verdict for [Penal Code section] 187, yes or no?"'43 The trial judge
declined to answer the question and simply repeated the instructions
on felony-murder and causation. The jury convicted Howard of
second-degree murder and a violation of section 2800.2, which states:
(a) If a person flees or attempts to elude a pursuing
peace officer in violation of Section 2800.1 and the
pursued vehicle is driven in a willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property, the
person driving the vehicle, upon conviction, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or by
confinement in the county jail.... The court may also
142. Id. at 1132-33.
143. Id. at 1134.
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impose a fine.., or may impose both that
imprisonment or confinement and fine.
(b) For purposes of this section, a willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property
includes, but is not limited to, driving while fleeing or
attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer during
which time either three or more violations that are
assigned a traffic violation point count under Section
12810 occur, or damage to property occurs.144
Zeroing in on the definition of "willful or wanton disregard" as
including driving in a manner that involves three traffic violation
points, the CSC concluded that a violation of section 2800.2 is not
inherently dangerous to human life:
Violations that are assigned points... [that] can
be committed without endangering human life include
driving an unregistered vehicle owned by the driver,
driving with a suspended license, driving on a highway
at slightly more than 55 miles per hour when a higher
speed limit has not been posted, failing to come to a
complete stop at a stop sign, and making a right turn
without signaling for 100 feet before turning.45
In other words, if a person flees a pursuing police officer by
driving an unregistered vehicle fifty-six mph in a fifty-five mph zone
and later signals for a right turn only ninety-nine feet before turning,
that conduct constitutes "willful disregard for safety of persons or
property" as a matter of law. Obviously, driving in such a manner is
not inherently dangerous to human life.
It is painfully clear that the CSC's approach to the inherent
dangerousness issue in Howard was abstract, as it completely ignored
the wildly reckless abandon of the defendant's actual driving. It is
equally clear that the Howard Court abjured "ordinary commission"
of section 2800.2 as a field of reference for its dangerousness analysis.
Although it is impossible, without comprehensive statistics, to say
exactly what the "ordinary" or "average" section 2800.2 violation
looks like, it most certainly does not involve driving fifty-six mph and
144. Id. at 1137.
145. Id. at 1137-38 (citations omitted).
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signaling for right turns a tad late. The Howard Court employed a
minimum conduct field of reference, which is to say, it imagined the
least risky conduct that nonetheless would constitute a section 2800.2
violation, then deemed those hypothetical facts not to be inherently
dangerous to human life.
That brings us, finally, to the most recent major CSC decision on
the second-degree felony-murder rule, People v. Sarun Chun.'"
1
Chun, a gang member, fired shots from his vehicle into another
vehicle he knew was owned by a rival gang member. Someone else in
Chun's vehicle also fired shots into the other vehicle. The other
vehicle had darkened windows and, unbeknownst to Chun and his
confederate, was actually occupied by the rival gang member's sister
and her friend. The sister was killed, and it was not clear who had
fired the fatal shot.'47 Chun was convicted of second-degree murder
after the jury had been instructed that it could convict him of second-
degree felony-murder based on the underlying felony of shooting into
an occupied vehicle as either a principal or aider and abettor."
48
As noted earlier, Chun was a path-breaking decision on second-
degree felony-murder in California because it held, contrary to
decades of precedent, that the second-degree felony-murder rule is
mandated by statute.' 9 Chun also broke new ground on another
important front, which is the so-called "merger" limitation on second-
degree felony-murder. Starting with People v. Ireland, the CSC had
refused to allow the operation of the second-degree felony-murder
rule where the underlying felony was "integral to" and "included in
fact" within the resulting homicide.5 In Ireland, the jury was
instructed that it could convict of second-degree felony-murder if the
killing was the "direct causal result of the perpetration of ... assault
with a deadly weapon."'' The defendant had shot and killed his wife
point blank while he was heavily intoxicated.'52 The CSC found that
the instruction was erroneous because the assault was integral to and
included in fact within the resulting homicide.'53 It was up to the jury
to decide whether the defendant, under the circumstances, really
146. People v. Sarun Chun 45 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009).
147. Id. at 1179.
148. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 246). Curiously, the jury acquitted Chun of
shooting into an occupied vehicle.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 99-137.
150. People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 539 (1969).
151. Id. at 538.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 539.
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intended to kill his wife or whether it was instead a kind of
manslaughter. The prosecution should not have been permitted to
"bootstrap" the assault into murder if there was no independent
proof of malice aforethought.
5 1
As chronicled by the Chun opinion, so began a long and tortured
trail of decisions regarding the scope of the Ireland rule (also referred
to as California's version of the "merger" doctrine'55). This utterly
perplexing series of decisions is beyond the scope of this Article.
Suffice it to say that Chun repudiated these confusing decisions and
settled on a simple definition of the merger rule, namely, that a felony
may not serve as a predicate for a second-degree felony-murder
conviction if the felony is "assaultive in nature."'56
But if Chun augured a sea change in the merger limitation on
second-degree felony-murder, it did absolutely nothing to change the
law regarding the inherently dangerous felony limitation. "This
restriction is not at issue here," Justice Chin's opinion for the Court
flatly stated.57  Relying on Hansen's finding that shooting into an
inhabited dwelling house was inherently dangerous, Justice Chin
concluded that shooting into an occupied motor vehicle is also self-
evidently inherently dangerous. Chun, then said nothing new about
the inherently dangerous felony.
Let us now take stock of the case law on inherently dangerous
felonies. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the abstract
approach to this doctrine breaks down into two parts: (1) the proper
factual field of reference (i.e., minimum conduct or ordinary
commission); and (2) the threshold of risk that qualifies as inherently
dangerous. The law on the latter is relatively clear. In Patterson, the
CSC carefully explained that the correct threshold of risk is "high
probability."'59  It is true that the Howard opinion recites the
threshold as "substantial risk,"' 6' but it makes no acknowledgement of
the apparent discrepancy, much less any reasoned explanation for it.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 539; see also id. at n.15 (collecting authorities on the merger doctrine from
other states).
156. Chun, 45 Cal. 4th at 1200-01. Of course, there is still the possibility that certain
felonies will be in a gray area between "assaultive" and "non-assaultive," but this rule is
considerably less confusing than the prior law.
157. Id. at 1188.
158. Id.
159. People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 618 (1989).
160. People v. Howard, 34 Cal. 4th 1129, 1135 (2005).
[Vol. 43:1
Fall 2015] CALIFORNIA SECOND-DEGREE FELONY-MURDER 41
In the absence of any such explanation, it is best to assume that the
"high probability" standard still governs.
Unfortunately, the first part of the existing abstract approach to
inherent dangerousness is not clear at all. Three decisions-Satchell,
Burroughs, and Howard-clearly come down on the side of minimum
conduct as the proper field of reference. Three other decisions-
Patterson, Hansen, and Nichols-clearly come down on the side of
ordinary commission as the proper reference. Chun could also be
counted as an ordinary commission case, but it gives no reasoning
except to suggest that Hansen was virtually on all fours. None of
these cases has ever overruled any of the others on the inherently
dangerous felony point. Thus, technically, they are all good law.
The scorecard, in terms of which felonies have been determined
inherently dangerous and which have not, is decidedly mixed.
Felonies that have been held inherently dangerous to life include
shooting at an inhabited dwelling,' poisoning with intent to injure,'62
arson of a motor vehicle, 63 grossly negligent discharge of a firearm,"6
manufacturing methamphetamine,'165 kidnapping,' 66 and reckless or
malicious possession of a destructive device. 67 Felonies that have
been held not inherently dangerous to life include practicing medicine
without a license under conditions creating a risk of great bodily
harm, serious physical or mental illness, or death,'6s  false169
imprisonment by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit, possession of a
concealable firearm by a convicted felon,170 possession of a sawed-off
171 172 th 3
shotgun, escape, grand theft,73 conspiracy to possess methedrine,'74
161. People v. Hansen, 9 Cal. 4th 300 (1994), overruled by People v. Sarun Chun 45
Cal. 4th 1172 (2009).
162. People v. Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d 177 (1971).
163. People v. Nichols, 3 Cal. 3d 150 (1970).
164. People v. Robertson, 34 Cal. 4th 156 (2004), overruled by People v. Sarun Chun
45 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009).
165. People v. James, 62 Cal. App. 4th 244, 271 (1998).
166. People v. Greenberger, 58 Cal. App. 4th 298, 377 (1997); People v. Pearch, 229
Cal. App. 3d 1282, 1299 (1991).
167. People v. Morse, 2 Cal. App. 4th 620, 646 (1992).
168. People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824 (1984).
169. People v. Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d 86, 92-96 (1977), overruled by People v. Flood,
18 Cal. 4th 470 (1998).
170. People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 38-39 (1971), overruled by People v. Flood, 18
Cal. 4th 470 (1998).
171. Id. at 41-43.
172. People v. Lopez, 6 Cal. 3d 45 (1971).
173. People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574 (1966), overruled by People v. Flood, 18 Cal. 4th
470 (1998).
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extortion,175 furnishing phencyclidine,76 and child endangerment or
abuse.177 If there is a discernable pattern here, it is subtle indeed.
This recitation reminds one of Justice Scalia's in Johnson. From
2007 to 2011, the USSC reviewed four cases presenting the question
of which state felonies posed a "serious potential risk of physical
injury" within the meaning of the ACCA residual clause. First, the
Court held that attempted burglary in Florida does present a serious
potential risk of physical injury.178 Then, it held that driving under the
influence in New Mexico does not present a serious potential risk of
injury.179  Next, the Court held that failure to report to a penal
institution in Illinois does not present a serious potential risk.8 ° In
2011, the Court held that vehicular flight from a law enforcement
officer in Indiana does present a serious potential risk.'8' In Johnson,
the government asked the Court to deem possession of a short-
barreled shotgun in Minnesota a serious potential risk of injury. The
Court despaired of finding a workable test to determine serious
potential risk, asked the parties to brief the question of vagueness,
and finally declared the clause vague. The Court declared its residual
clause jurisprudence a failed enterprise:
This Court has acknowledged that the failure of
"persistent efforts ... to establish a standard" can
provide evidence of vagueness. Here, this Court's
repeated attempts and repeated failures to craft a
principled and objective standard out of the residual
clause confirm its hopeless indeterminacy.
[C]ommon sense is a much less useful criterion than it
sounds .... How does common sense help a federal
court discern where the "ordinary case" of vehicular
flight in Indiana lies along this spectrum [of risk]?
Common sense has not even produced a consistent
174. People v. Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 452 (1965).
175. People v. Smith, 62 Cal. App. 4th 1233, 1236-38 (1998).
176. People v. Taylor, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1084, 1099 (1992).
177. People v. Lee, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1214, 1229 (1991).
178. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007), overruled by Johnson v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
179. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 147-48 (2008).
180. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 128-30 (2009).
181. Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011), overruled by Johnson, 135 S. Ct.
2551.
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conception of the degree of risk posed by each of the
four enumerated [ACCA] crimes; there is no reason to
expect it to fare any better with respect to thousands
of unenumerated crimes.82
The seeming unpredictability of results under the residual clause
was not by itself what led the USSC to declare the clause vague. It
was also the fact that the Court had tried so many different
approaches and failed with all of them. The Court had tried
comparing felonies not enumerated in the ACCA to felonies that
were enumerated. It tried fashioning a test-"purposeful, aggressive
and violent." It tried statistics. It tried statistics plus "common
experience." 83
Every one of these approaches fell short. The felonies
enumerated in the ACCA were too disparate, risk-wise, to provide
guidance (burglary, extortion, arson, and "use of explosives," the last
of which isn't even the name of a felony at all). The "purposeful,
aggressive, and violent" test had no basis in the text of the ACCA.
The statistical approach failed because there simply was not the kind
of comprehensive database required to draw meaningful conclusions,
and "common experience" is only persuasive to the degree that
everybody experiences the world the same way.
By swapping a few choice words, Justice Scalia could well have
been writing an opinion declaring California's inherently dangerous
felony doctrine a failed enterprise. Before the 1960s, California
ascertained dangerousness by looking at the actual facts. Then it
switched to an "abstract" approach with no rationalization or
articulation of any field of reference or threshold of risk. Then it
adopted minimum conduct as a field of reference, but still no
articulation of threshold. Then, without repudiating minimum
conduct, it flipped to an ordinary commission field of reference.
Then it articulated "high probability" as a threshold. Finally, in its
last two decisions, it used minimum conduct for one and ordinary
commission for the other, as well as articulating "substantial risk" as a
threshold. "What sets ACCA apart from those statutes-and what
confirms its incurable vagueness-is our repeated inability to craft a
182. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558-59 (citation omitted).
183. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2278 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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principled test out of the statutory text" stated Justice Scalia."8
Precisely.
C. Application of Vagueness Analysis to the Felony-Murder Rule
The rationale of Johnson wholly and precisely encompasses
California's current inherently dangerous felony doctrine. According
to Johnson, the residual clause's core infirmity was that it anchored
risk to hypothetical facts-that is, that the measurement of risk was
based on an idealized version of the felony. From a vagueness
standpoint, the problem with such a rule is that neither the concept of
risk nor hypothetical facts is attached to anything concrete. To use a
mechanical metaphor, it would be to connect one pivoting joint to
another pivoting joint, with neither joint attached to anything
stationary. Both the residual clause of ACCA and the inherently
dangerous felony doctrine in California do exactly that. Furthermore,
while I appreciate the lawyerly intuition that the residual clause of
ACCA and the inherently dangerous felony rule seem like very
different laws, intuitions must not be acted upon in the face of hard
logic. If we are to treat the two situations differently, we must be able
to articulate some meaningful basis for differential treatment. When
someone serving life in California prison for second-degree felony-
murder now articulates a precise reason why Johnson applies to the
inherently dangerous felony doctrine-namely, that in both situations
the measurement of risk is hinged to a hypothesized version of facts-
it is not enough for the system to respond, "Well, it's just not the
same thing. They feel different. So you will spend the rest of your
life in prison." This Article has made what might be called a prima
facie showing that the ACCA residual clause and the inherently
dangerous felony doctrine share the same constitutional infirmity.
The burden now shifts to the government to explain precisely why the
comparison is inapt. Intuition, no matter how strong or widely
shared, is not an adequate rebuttal. Let us, then, explore five possible
grounds upon which these two doctrines might be distinguished for
vagueness purposes.
One possible ground of distinction would be that felony-murder
differs from a mandatory minimum sentence because the very notion
of felony-murder recognizes that felons give up any standing to
complain about their treatment when they commit the underlying
felony and thereby kill someone. A second possible argument would
184. Id. at 2287 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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be that "inherent dangerousness" (felony-murder) is not the same
thing as "serious potential risk" (the ACCA). A third possible ground
of distinction would be that risk of death (felony-murder) is different
from risk of physical injury (ACCA). A fourth possible ground of
distinction is that the ACCA is a sentencing enhancement statute,
whereas the felony-murder doctrine is a rule of liability. Finally, it
could be argued that the residual clause in ACCA was compared to
felonies explicitly enumerated elsewhere in ACCA, whereas there are
no enumerated felonies that trigger second-degree felony-murder.
Each one of these asserted distinctions fails.
No doubt the animating force behind the felony-murder rule is
an intuition that those who commit felonies forfeit their right to the
niceties of the mens rea doctrine when they kill someone. It is
sometimes said that the felony-murder rule deters killings precisely
because of its simplicity: you do the crime and you kill someone, you
do the time. If you commit a serious offense, we do not want to hear
that you "didn't mean to kill anyone." However reputable or
disreputable this intuition may be, it does not distinguish the felony-
murder rule from the residual clause of the ACCA. The ACCA is a
federal three-strikes statute. It operates on the basis of a highly
analogous popular intuition about deterring crime: three strikes and
you're out. You commit three felonies, we do not want to hear any
arguments about whether they were technically "violent" or not. You
have forfeited your right to complain. Yet that did not stop the
Supreme Court from holding the residual clause unconstitutionally
vague.
And for good reason. Congress may not delete someone's
constitutional right to adequate notice of what a criminal statute
covers. The ACCA might have more deterrence potential if it were
exempt from the constitutional rule against vague statutes, but it does
not matter. Similarly, the second-degree felony-murder rule might
deter more people if it were exempted from the vagueness doctrine,
but that move is simply out of bounds. The Legislature may delete
the mens rea requirement from a criminal offense, so long as that
does not violate the Constitution. The courts have (rightly or
wrongly) decided that the felony-murder rule does not violate the
Constitution on the ground that it lacks a requirement of mental
culpability with respect to the killing. But the Legislature may not
delete the requirement of constitutionally adequate notice for any
offense.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
The second asserted ground of distinction requires little response
because both "dangerousness" and "risk" denote probabilistic
concepts. The CSC has always treated dangerousness as the question
of likelihood that an actor's commission of a given felony would bring
about the death of another human being. The USSC has treated
residual clause risk as the likelihood that an actor's commission of a
given felony would bring about physical injury to another human
being. Neither inquiry involves any normative consideration, as in
whether the danger/risk was unjustifiable. In either case, it is
assumed that the criminality of the conduct makes it per se
unjustifiable. The inquiry with both dangerousness and risk is purely
predictive, not qualitative in any way. For vagueness purposes-that
is, for the purpose of providing notice to actors-dangerousness and
risk are materially indistinguishable.
Nor does the third asserted ground require much analysis. There
is no meaningful difference, vagueness-wise, between risk of death
and risk of physical injury. It is true that death is unambiguous
(putting aside cessation of brain activity/persistent vegetative state
controversies), while the existence or nonexistence of physical injury
can be contested in concrete cases. But this argument completely
ignores the case law. The USSC's residual clause jurisprudence has
never had any problem with defining physical injury, in the abstract
or in concrete situations. Instead, the USSC's problem has been
defining "serious potential risk" in the abstract-just as the CSC's
problem has been defining "inherent dangerousness" in the abstract.
There is no distinction to be made between risk of death and risk of
injury, from a notice standpoint. People in California have no more
ability to predict which felonies will be held inherently dangerous to
human life than people throughout the United States could predict
which felonies posed a "serious potential risk" of physical injury-
and for the exact same reason. No one can accurately predict how
much imagination judges are going to employ in hypothesizing facts.'
The fourth asserted distinction is the easiest to dispatch. Yes, the
ACCA residual clause is a rule of sentencing, while the second-
degree felony-murder rule (which subsumes within it the inherently
dangerous felony limitation) is a substantive rule of criminal law.
One governs the degree of punishment while the other governs
185. Cf. Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) ("[T]o find that a state
statute creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a federal statute
requires more than the application of legal imagination to a state statute's language.").
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liability. But if this distinction has any purchase at all, it cuts in favor
of finding vagueness here. Surely actors are no less entitled to clear
notice about the boundaries of substantive criminal liability rules than
they are about sentencing rules. If we were to recognize a distinction
between the two, actors would be more entitled to notice about
liability rules.1" In Johnson itself, the Court stated that the due
process doctrine of vagueness "appl[ies] not only to statutes defining
elements of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences." '117  In
support of that proposition the Court cited United States v.
Batchelder, which stated that "vague sentencing provisions may pose
constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the
consequences of violating a given criminal statute."' 8
The fifth asserted ground of distinction is that the ACCA
residual clause was made unique by its juxtaposition to specifically
enumerated felonies, which further complicated the risk analysis.
Section 924(e)(2)(B) states:
[T]he term "violent felony" means any crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the
use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive
device that would be punishable by imprisonment for
such term if committed by an adult, that-
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of
another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents
a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another .... "9
The focus here is on subsection (ii). It expressly designates
burglary, arson, extortion, and felonies involving use of explosives as
"violent," thus making them count toward the three strikes that
186. Compare Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467-68 (1991) (suggesting that
vagueness scrutiny for sentencing statutes is less exacting than for primary criminal
conduct statutes, and stating, "[t]his is particularly so since whatever debate there is would
center around the appropriate sentence and not the criminality of the conduct.")
187. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
188. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979).
189. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (West 2006).
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trigger a mandatory minimum sentence. The enumeration of those
four felonies is followed by the residual or "otherwise" clause, which
includes any other felonies that involve conduct presenting a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.
In Johnson, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court mentioned this
juxtaposition of enumerated and unenumerated felonies as a factor
contributing to the vagueness of the residual clause:
By asking whether the crime "otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk,"
moreover, the residual clause forces courts to interpret
''serious potential risk" in light of the four enumerated
crimes-burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes
involving the use of explosives. These offenses are far
from clear in respect to the degree of risk each poses.
Does the ordinary burglar invade an occupied home
by night or an unoccupied home by day? Does the
typical extortionist threaten his victim in person with
the use of force, or does he threaten his victim by mail
with the revelation of embarrassing personal
information? By combining indeterminacy about how
to measure the risk posed by a crime with
indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the
crime to qualify as a violent felony, the residual clause
produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than
the Due Process Clause tolerates.' 9
This structural feature of the ACCA-placing enumerated felonies
next to a residual clause, and thereby complicating the risk analysis-
is nearly identical to California Penal Code section 189. As noted
above, the structure of section 189 is to enumerate certain situations,
most of them commissions of underlying felonies, in which a murder
is first-degree, and then to declare that all other murders are second-
degree. In other words, section 189's second-degree murder
provision is itself a residual clause:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of a
destructive device or explosive, a weapon of mass
destruction, knowing use of ammunition designed
190. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison, lying in
wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is
committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to
perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary,
mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act
punishable under Section 206, 286, 288, 288a, or 289,
or any murder which is perpetrated by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle,
intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle
with the intent to inflict death, is murder of the first
degree. All other kinds of murders are of the second
degree. 9'
The last sentence of section 189 is a residual clause, and it creates
exactly the same problem that plagued the ACCA residual clause in
terms of gauging risk. When a court asks whether an unenumerated
felony is inherently dangerous, it performs that analysis in the shadow
of section 189's many enumerated felonies. But how often do those
enumerated felonies end up in a killing? Justice Scalia used burglary
as an example of the difficulty of gauging risk in the abstract.
Occupied home at night or unoccupied home in the daytime? In the
absence of comprehensive statistics,' there is simply no nonarbitrary
answer to that question. Yet section 189 specifically enumerates
burglary, just as the ACCA residual clause does. Indeed, the risk
analysis for enumerated felonies in section 189 is worse, because it
includes attempts to commit all those enumerated felonies as well as
successful commissions of the felonies. If it is hard to gauge the risk
of injury or death in an abstract burglary, how hard is it to gauge the
risk of injury or death in an attempted burglary? The mind reels.
One potential confusion must be avoided. In Johnson, the Court
stated that it would not be vague for a statute to measure risk off of
real-world facts or "statutory elements.''113  One might get the
impression from this statement that California's inherently dangerous
felony doctrine is therefore valid because the abstract approach to
determining dangerousness is based on an analysis of statutory
191. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 2015) (emphasis added).
192. And comprehensive statistics do not exist. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
193. Id.
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elements. But that is plainly not what the Johnson Court meant. In
order to see this, one must return to the text of the ACCA.
The relevant portion of the statute has three parts. The first part,
section 924(e)(2)(B)(i), defines a violent felony as any felony that
"has as an element.., the use of physical force against the person of
another." The second part, which is the first clause of section
924(e)(2)(B)(ii), specifically denominates as violent felonies four
particular offenses-burglary, extortion, arson, and use of explosives.
The third part, the residual clause, which is the second clause of
section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), includes any other felony whose conduct
involves a serious potential risk of injury. When Justice Scalia refers
to "statutory elements" being an acceptable, non-vague mode of
analysis, he does not mean the kind of elemental analysis that
California courts perform in the abstract approach to determining
inherently dangerous felonies. He means the kind of elemental
analysis involved in section 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-that is, literally, does the
element of force appear in the statute defining the underlying felony?
So, what is the difference? Under section 924(e)(2)(B)(i), the
question is whether the text of a statute contains the word "force."
Traditional rape statutes contained the term force; some of the
modern ones do not. This kind of analysis is as determinative as it
gets in the law. Even if section 924(e)(2)(b)(i) extends to case law
reading a force requirement into a statute that lacks an explicit
mention of the word, the analysis is highly determinative for
constitutional purposes. However unrealistic, one is presumed to
know the judicial gloss on criminal statutes.
The elemental analysis in California's inherently dangerous
felony cases, on the other hand, is not highly determinative. The
question there is not whether "inherent dangerousness" is a formal
element of the underlying felony; it is whether the formal elements of
the underlying felony can be said, at a minimum, to require conduct
that can fairly be characterized as inherently dangerous to human life.
If the inherently dangerous felony cases pivoted on whether the
statute contained the word "danger" or "dangerous," they would
have no vagueness problem. If they pivoted on the presence or
absence of the word "risk," they would not be vague. Even if the
inherently dangerous felony cases pivoted on whether judicial gloss
had read "danger" or "risk" into a statute, they would not be
sufficiently vague to violate due process.
Under the minimum conduct cases like Satchell, Burroughs, and
Howard, the question is whether one could imagine any plausible set
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of facts which: (1) satisfies the essential elements of the offense; and
(2) does not pose a "high probability" of killing someone. This is
anything but bright-line analysis, for it contains two open-ended
inquiries. Which hypothetical facts are "plausible" is an inherently
subjective inquiry, as is the question of what constitutes a "high
probability." Both inquiries are subject to significant disagreement
among reasonable judges, which is exactly what has happened. The
result is a near total lack of predictability-and, therefore, notice to
actors-of which felonies will be found inherently dangerous.
The "ordinary commission" cases like Patterson and Hansen are
no less arbitrary. In Patterson, the CSC remanded to the trial court to
consider "medical articles and reports" offered by the government to
prove that furnishing cocaine is inherently dangerous to human life.
194
Although I have been unable to find a record of what happened on
remand, it is extremely doubtful whether the government actually
produced comprehensive statistics on what happens when one person
furnishes cocaine to another person. Doubtless there are plenty of
"medical articles and reports"'1 95 documenting the frequency of fatal
cocaine overdoses, but that would not have been sufficient to resolve
the legal question. The government would have had to have
produced comprehensive statistical evidence of how often people
have fatal overdoses after ingesting cocaine that has been furnished to
them in violation of California Health & Safety Code section 11352.
In other words, a report confirming that x number of people died
from cocaine overdoses in any given year would not satisfy the
government's burden. The relevant question would be: In what
percentage of cases involving violations of section 11352 do people
die? If 100 people died of cocaine overdoses in a year, that seems like
a lot; but if 100,000,000 cocaine transactions in violation of section
11352 occurred that year, that amounts to .000001, which is
infinitesimal. On the other hand, if the 100 fatalities came from
10,000 transactions, that amounts to .01, which is fairly frequent. It is
extremely doubtful whether the government could have produced
statistics at that level of granularity.
It is the double whammy of uncertainty that made the residual
clause unconstitutional, and which makes the abstract approach to the
inherently dangerous felony doctrine equally unconstitutional. Using
an abstract approach to imagine facts that are then gauged for some
194. People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 625 (1989).
195. Id.
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threshold of risk amounts to an abstraction of an abstraction. It is not
merely to ask what Hamlet would have looked like if Shakespeare
had been born to sharecroppers in Mississippi; it is then to ask
whether contemporary literary critics would have liked it. However
fun that might be at a cocktail party, that kind of hyper-imaginative
exercise cannot produce the minimal predictability and notice
necessary to satisfy due process in the criminal law. As things
currently stand, the second-degree felony-murder rule in California is
unconstitutionally vague.
III. The "Actual Facts" Approach
This Article has demonstrated the need for action of some kind.
In theory, that action could come from the California Legislature.
The Legislature could proactively amend its homicide statute to
codify the second-degree felony-murder rule with an explicit "actual
facts" approach to determining which felonies are dangerous enough
to qualify. That would be constitutional. Or it could codify the
second-degree felony-murder rule with an exhaustive list of felonies
that qualify. That would be constitutional. Or it could explicitly
abrogate the second-degree felony-murder rule.
Political action in the absence of judicial action is, however,
extremely unlikely. The responsibility of remedying the current
constitutional infirmity of the second-degree felony-murder rule will
almost certainly fall on the courts-ultimately, the CSC. The CSC
does not have the option of creating an exhaustive list of felonies that
qualify as predicates for the operation of the second-degree felony-
murder rule. That would be to encroach on legislative prerogative.
That leaves two remaining options: switching to an "actual facts"
approach or abolishing the second-degree felony-murder rule
altogether. Candor requires me to acknowledge that, unlike my
argument about the constitutionality of the abstract approach to
determining dangerous felonies, I have no claim that logic requires
any choice between these two remedial options. Nothing more than
logic is required to demonstrate the fatal inconsistency of the abstract
approach to dangerous felonies under Johnson, which is legally
binding on California. However, logic requires only that something
be done about the current rule-it does not dictate what that
something is. With that disclaimer, I now proceed to offer a few brief
thoughts about the "actual facts" or "actual conduct" approach.
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Let us begin with the critical observation that, although the
Legislature is unlikely to do anything until the courts act, the
Legislature will always have the last say on whether or not to have a
second-degree felony-murder rule-if it wants to have that say. If the
CSC strikes the current rule down as void for vagueness and does not
replace it, the Legislature could react by adding a section to the
homicide statute explicitly codifying the second-degree felony-murder
rule and listing all the felonies that support it, or, more likely,
explicitly requiring an "actual facts" approach to determining which
felonies are sufficiently dangerous. Thus, with respect to remedy, the
Court need not be concerned about displacing legislative prerogative.
There is no occasion here for deference to the Legislature. No matter
which option the CSC chooses, it will not destroy the Legislature's
ability to have the last word. The CSC should therefore exercise its
best independent judgment about what remedial course to take.
California stands alone in its exclusively abstract approach to the
dangerous felony limitation on felony-murder. Most states have a
felony-murder rule, and most of those states have a requirement that
the underlying felony be dangerous to human life. Among these
states, California alone takes a purely abstract approach. Other states
that retain a felony-murder rule hold that the "foreseeable"
dangerousness of the underlying felony is to be measured by the
circumstances of the case at bar.'96
To see this, consider some decisions from other state supreme
courts. In Commonwealth v. Matchett, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court reversed a second-degree felony-murder conviction
based on extortion.' 97 "We hold today that when a death results from
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of the statutory felony of
extortion, there can be no conviction of felony-murder in the second
degree unless the jury find that the extortion involved circumstances
demonstrating the defendant's conscious disregard of the risk to
human life," stated the Court.'98
196. Some courts have adopted what superficially appears to be a hybrid rule: i.e., that
the underlying felony qualifies if it is dangerous either in the abstract or under the
circumstances of the case. See e.g., Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262 (Del. 1967). On closer
inspection, this amounts to nothing more than an actual-facts approach, at least if
''abstract" means "minimum conduct." There can never be a case where the felony was
not dangerous under the circumstances, yet was dangerous to human life in the abstract,
for the minimum conduct version of the abstract test rules out felonies unless they are
dangerous to human life in every possible circumstance.
197. Commonwealth v. Matchett, 436 N.E.2d 402 (Mass. 1982).
198. Id. at 410 (citation omitted).
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In Jenkins v. State, where the predicate felony was fourth-degree
burglary, the Delaware Supreme Court held, "It is the opinion of the
Court... that the felony-second degree murder rule of this State
should be limited to homicides proximately caused by the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of felonies which are, by
nature or circumstances, foreseeably dangerous to human life,
whether such felonies be common law or statutory."'" "Burglary in
the fourth degree may, or may not, be foreseeably dangerous to
human life, depending upon whether someone may be reasonably
expected to be present in the building, and upon other circumstances
of the case," the Jenkins Court reasoned.'
In State v. Wallace, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld
a felony-murder conviction based on sodomy committed against an
eight-year-old boy.2 1 There, the Court held:
[T]he felony-murder rule in Maine requires in addition
to a causal relationship between the felony being
committed, or attempted, and the death, proof beyond
a reasonable doubt that the manner or method of its
commission, or attempted commission, presents a
serious threat to human life or is likely to cause serious
bodily harm.1
The Court conceded that consensual adult sodomy is not necessarily
dangerous to human life, but, "while force and violence are not
necessarily involved in committing this crime, it may equally well be
committed by the use of potentially deadly force." 203
In State v. Harrison, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that
false imprisonment may qualify as a predicate felony for purposes of
the felony-murder rule if the manner of its commission is
dangerous.2 In New Mexico, the legislature has denominated some
felonies as first degree, while others are of lesser degree. A killing
caused by the commission of a first-degree felony is automatically
felony-murder without regard to whether the circumstances were
199. Jenkins, 230 A.2d at 269.
200. Id.
201. State v. Wallace, 333 A.2d 72 (Me. 1975).
202. Id. at 81.
203. Id. at 82.
204. State v. Harrison, 564 P.2d 1321 (N.M. 1977) (superseded by Tafoya v. Baca, 702
P.2d 1001 (N.M. 1985)).
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dangerous. In Harrison, however, the Court held that the same rule
should not apply to killings caused by the commission of lesser-degree
felonies. "[I]n a felony murder charge, involving a collateral lesser-
degree felony, that felony must be inherently dangerous or committed
under circumstances that are inherently dangerous," the Court
stated. 26  Contrasting its holding with the California rule, the
Harrison Court explained:
Today the courts apply this test in two differing
manners: (1) the felony is examined in the abstract to
determine whether it is inherently dangerous to
human life [citing Satchell] or (2) both the nature of
the felony and the circumstances surrounding its
commission may be considered to determine whether
it was inherently dangerous to human life. We adopt
the latter test.2°7
Further, in State v. Thompson, the North Carolina Supreme
Court considered whether a killing caused by the commission of a
felonious breaking and entering could support a verdict of first-
degree felony-murder.2°8 North Carolina's first-degree murder statute
states that any murder committed "in the perpetration of or attempt
to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, or burglary or other felony
shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree." 2°9 In order for an
unenumerated felony to serve as a predicate for first-degree murder
in North Carolina, that felony must be either dangerous in the
abstract or foreseeably dangerous under the circumstances:
In our view, and we so hold, any unspecified felony is
within the purview of G.S. § 14-17 if the commission or
attempted commission thereof creates any substantial
foreseeable human risk and actually results in the loss
of life. This includes, but is not limited to, felonies
which are inherently dangerous to life. Under this
rule, any unspecified felony which is inherently
205. Id. at 1324 ("In felony murder cases where the felony is a first-degree felony such
a presumption is appropriate, but not where the felony is of a lesser degree.").
206. Id.
207. Id. (citations omitted).
208. State v. Thompson, 185 S.E.2d 666 (N.C. 1972).
209. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (West 2015).
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dangerous to human life, or foreseeably dangerous to
human life due to the circumstances of its commission,
is within the purview of G.S. § 14-17."'
The Thompson rule is essentially identical to the rule in
Harrison, in the sense that a felony qualifies if it is either inherently
(abstractly) dangerous or if it is foreseeably dangerous under the
circumstances of the case. This superficially appears to be a "hybrid"
rule, the "best of both worlds," because it includes both the abstract
and actual fact approaches. But any hybrid quality is chimerical. The
"addition" of the abstract approach to the ordinary commission
approach actually adds nothing at all. In any case where, under the
circumstances, the underlying felony was not foreseeably dangerous
to human life, the felony will not be dangerous in the abstract either.
Under the minimum conduct approach to abstraction, a felony is only
inherently dangerous if every imaginable instance would be
dangerous. By definition, if the case at bar presents a "non-
dangerous" situation, then the minimum conduct test is not met.
Under the ordinary commission approach to abstraction, a felony is
only inherently dangerous if its ordinary, typical or average
commission is dangerous. But if the defendant's conduct in the case
at bar is not "foreseeably dangerous to human life," then again,
virtually by definition, the ordinary commission of that felony is not
dangerous. The term "foreseeable" is largely parasitic on the notion
of ordinariness or typicality. An act is only foreseeably dangerous to
human life if similar acts lead to death on at least a semi-regular
basis."' Thus, the hybrid approach followed in Harrison and
Thompson (and apparently in many other jurisdictions212) really
amounts to nothing more than the actual facts approach.
Because the "hybrid" approach turns out to be little more than
an actual facts approach, there is no vagueness problem with it. Such
an approach is intellectually dishonest-it sounds like the best of both
worlds when in fact it represents only one world-but it is not
unconstitutional.
210. Thompson, 185 S.E.2d at 672.
211. With the possible exception of brand new technologies, where no pattern of
dangerousness has yet been established, but which plausibly have the potential to kill
(such as Tasers, when they were new).
212. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
342 (3d ed. 2008) (collecting authorities).
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Conclusion
If the CSC were to swap the abstract approach out for an actual
facts approach, it would solve the constitutional problem. But I
believe that would be a mistake. The actual conduct test is
intellectually dishonest and unfaithful to society's basic understanding
of murder as the purposeful or extremely reckless taking of human
life. It permits individuals to be punished for murder based on
nothing more than negligence.
Murder is the most serious condemnation available to the
criminal law. California has many grades of manslaughter, including
voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and several
grades of vehicular manslaughter, depending on just how intoxicated
and/or reckless the driver. The epithet "murder" is reserved for
killings brought about by more than carelessness or even recklessness.
This is to say nothing of the severity of the punishment for murder in
California, which is a mandatory life sentence. The judge has no
discretion whatsoever after even a second-degree murder conviction.
The formal mandatory sentence of "15 years to life" conceals the
reality of this punishment, which would be more aptly explained as
"life in prison, with the small possibility that the Board of Prison
Terms (all political appointees) will grant parole at some point after
the minimum term of years has been served." In fact, less than
twenty percent of people sentenced to life in California are ever
paroled,23 and the only other ways for them to be released are to have
their convictions overturned or to receive executive clemency.
If the conceptual paradigm of malice, and therefore murder, is an
intentional killing, felony-murder is miles from that paradigm. What
is colloquially referred to as "implied malice" or "conscious
disregard" murder already represents a significant attenuation from
the paradigm. To be convicted of this form of murder, the
government must prove that the defendant acted in the face of a
conscious disregard for the risk that a human being would be killed.214
The defendant must have actually considered that risk and acted in
spite of it. Note that conscious disregard of some risk of killing is not
enough; it must be consciousness of a high risk, which distinguishes
213. See UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: CALIFORNIA PAROLE PROCESS,
http://uscpcjp.com/legal-overview/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
214. People v. Knoller, 41 Cal. 4th 139, 170 (2007).
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this form of murder from mere reckless homicide."5 A killing in the
face of a conscious disregard of a less-than-high risk of killing is
involuntary manslaughter, which, in California, is punishable by two,
three or four years in prison."'
The classic case of involuntary manslaughter is a criminally
negligent killing.1 7 In such a prosecution, the government need not
prove that the defendant actually thought about the risk that his
conduct might kill someone, it is enough that a hypothetical
"reasonable person" in the defendant's situation would have thought
about that risk and desisted from the conduct. When someone kills in
this situation, the conduct is highly socially irresponsible, and it
deserves both serious condemnation and punishment. As noted
above, California law treats this as involuntary manslaughter.
Some second-degree felony-murders also meet the requirements
for conscious disregard murder. Let them be judged by that
standard.218 It is wrong to lump criminally negligent killings in with
conscious disregard killings, both because of the lack of required
awareness in negligence and because of the lower risk threshold in
negligence. Some felony-murders are nothing more than criminally
negligent killings, so the government should not be permitted to get a
felony-murder instruction that effectively serves to water down the
"reasonable doubt" standard for the requisite mental element of
conscious disregard murder. The government should sink or swim
215. People v. Coddington, 23 Cal.4th 529, 593 (2000) (overruled by Price v. Superior
Court, 25 Cal. 4th 1046 (2001)). Although Knoller states the rule for conscious disregard
murder without specifying a threshold of risk ("We conclude that a conviction for second
degree murder, based on a theory of implied malice, requires proof that a defendant acted
with conscious disregard of the danger to human life"), this must have been an inadvertent
omission. The Court could not possibly have meant that a conscious disregard of the most
infinitesimal chance of death could satisfy the standard. Such a mental state could not
possibly qualify as "abandoned and malignant heart." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West
2015).
216. CAL. PENAL CODE § 193(b) (West 2015).
217. CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) (West 2015), which defines non-vehicular
manslaughter, states: "Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting
to a felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner, or without due caution and circumspection." The CSC has long held that this
definition generally equates to a criminally negligent killing. See People v. Howk, 56 Cal.
2d 687,703--04 (1961); People v. Penny, 44 Cal. 2d 861,879 (1955).
218. As noted above, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has adopted an
"actual facts" rule requiring that the defendant "consciously disregard the risk to human
life." Depending on the required quantum of risk that the defendant must have perceived,
this situates the Massachusetts felony-murder rule somewhere between reckless homicide
and extreme recklessness murder. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
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based on its ability to prove conscious disregard. Consciousness can
be proven by circumstantial evidence, and usually is. Where the
government cannot prove conscious disregard by direct or
circumstantial evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction
should be for no more than involuntary manslaughter. Such a killing
should not be punishable by life in prison.
Even if one has no problem with the notion of negligent murder
as a concept, there is a serious problem with the administration of the
"actual facts" test. In the real world, it strongly invites circular
reasoning. Once the jury has been walked through voluminous
evidence on how the killing occurred, replete with photos of the
corpse and detailed forensic analysis of the fatal wound(s), the
instructions will then ask the jury whether the felon's conduct was
"foreseeably dangerous" to human life. How likely is it that a jury,
having effectively watched this killing take place in super-slow motion
several times, will come to the conclusion that it was not foreseeably
dangerous? As Justice Grodin stated in Burroughs, under an actual
facts approach to dangerousness, "[T]he existence of the dead victim
might appear to lead inexorably to the conclusion that the underlying
felony is exceptionally hazardous."2"9 Hindsight is 20/20.
A felony-murder rule supposedly limited by a "dangerous
felony" requirement based on an "actual facts" approach is arguably
worse than a felony-murder rule with no dangerous felony limitation
at all. The implicit promise of a dangerous felony limitation is that
the system contains a structural safeguard against punishing purely
accidental killings as murder. This promise insulates the felony-
murder rule against criticism. Yet the promise is illusory, for the fact
of a killing "lead[s] inexorably" to the conclusion that the felony was
conducted in a dangerous manner. The actual facts approach would
thereby render the second-degree felony-murder rule politically
opaque. It would obscure from the Legislature's view the reality that
the felony-murder rule can, and inevitably will, be imposed in some
cases involving purely accidental killings in which there was no ex
ante foreseeability of a killing. In other words, the judicial adoption
of an actual facts approach would hinder the political process from
doing its job of evaluating the second-degree felony-murder rule for
what it really is.
When I was in law school, one of my professors told us, "The job
of academics is to look in dark corners and describe what we see." In
219. People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824,830 (1984).
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this dark corner of the criminal law, I see a rule that has been
rendered unenforceable by new USSC precedent. I see a rule whose
constitutionality could be saved only by flipping it to an approach that
is grossly inconsistent with the paradigm concept of murder as the
willful killing of another human being. I see a rule whose time is up.
